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INTRODUCTION
The following passage is from what the United States Court of Ap-
peals for the Seventh Circuit deemed an X-rated decision. It is taken
verbatim from one of a series of letters sent to a Black family in Illinois:
You filthy fag sick garbage puke slime vomit mutt sooner
mother fucker.... I wishes a vicious death upon your scum of
the earth head. You watch your back you faggott bastard less
you receive five bulletts in your spine. Your big black ugly
maggott witch wife should be hung or burned at the stake like
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witches used to you Fat Fuck Motherfucker. If I weren't a
child of God I'd catch you coming out of UPS and blow your
head to dust particles. Nevertheless your wife is in store for a
very dramatic/harmful incident. Before it is over that big black
scorcerer will pay a debt to society like no other black bitch
like her on earth.1
The above quote from United States v. Bohanon attests to the power
of words. Coupling such language with conduct makes its import even
greater. The intentional use of such words to injure marginahzed persons
has the potential to elicit a physiological response, generate emotions, and
lead to responsive actions. This potential remains largely unrecognized by
the American legal system.While in the United Kingdom,2 Australia,3 and
Canada4 the courts or legislatures acknowledge the provocative power of
words and symbols, American jurisprudence attempts a careful balancing
between, on the one hand, the provocative capacity of words and symbols
in the absence of conduct and, on the other hand, protecting the First
Amendment right to free speech) Where relevant, the mental health ef-
1. 290 E 3d 869,872 (7th Cir. 2002) (includes spelling and grammatical errors).
2. United Kingdom Law in Force Homicide Act, 1957, c. 11, § 3 (Eng.).
3. New South Wales Crimes Act, 1990, 5 23 (1990) (Austl.).The Australian provo-
cation statute is as follows:
(2) For the purposes of subsection (1), an act or omission causing death is an
act done or omitted under provocation where:
(a) the act or omission is the result of a loss of self-control on the part of the
accused that was induced by any conduct of the deceased (including grossly
insulting words or gestures) towards or affecting the accused, and
(b) that conduct of the deceased was such as could have induced an ordinary
person in the position of the accused to have so far lost self-control as to
have formed an intent to kill, or to inflict grievous bodily harm upon, the
deceased, whether that conduct of the deceased occurred immediately before
the act or omission causing death or at any previous time.
Id.; see also Brenda M. Baker, Provocation as a Defence for Abused Women Who Kill, 11 CAN.
J.L. &Juis. 193 (1998).
4. See Camille A. Nelson, (En)Raged or (En)Gaged: The Implications of Racial Context
to the Canadian Provocation Defence, 35 U. RicH. L. REv. 1007 (2002).
5. In a number of American jurisdictions, words are not adequate provocation
unless accompanied by conduct indicating a present intention and ability to cause the
defendant bodily harm. See, e.g.,Virginia v. Black, 123 S. Ct. 1536, 1548 (2003) (holding
that a Virginia statute that prohibited cross-burning with the intent to intimidate did not
violate the Constitution because it banned conduct rather than expression); Lang v. State,
250 A.2d 276 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1969) (stating that it is "generally held that mere words,
threats, menaces or gestures, however offensive and insulting, do not constitute adequate
provocation," but holding that provocation is insufficient to mitigate murder where, before
the shooting, the victim had called the appellant a "chump" and a "chicken," dared the
[VOL. 9:77
FALL 2003] Breaking the Camel's Back
fects stemming from racist abuse and violence should form part of the
deliberations in a criminal trial. The mitigatory defenses, in particular,
have a role to play in allowing due consideration of the psychological im-
pact of racism.
appellant to fight, shouted obscenities at him and shook his fist at him), cert. denied, 396
U.S. 971 (1969); see also Commonwealth v. Nelson, 523 A.2d 728, 733-34 (Pa. 1987) (al-
lowing provocation brought about by prolonged stress, anger, and hostility caused by
marital problems to provide grounds for a verdict of voluntary manslaughter rather than
murder).
Additionally, some words in and of themselves, even in the absence of accompany-
ing conduct, might properly be seen as "fighting words" pursuant to the constitutional law
definition. Fighting words, "those which by their very utterance inflict injury or tend to
incite an immediate breach of the peace," are not worthy of free speech protection. This
method of identifying fighting words is highly context-dependent as a particular speech
act may be protected under the First Amendment in one set of circumstances, while under
different circumstances, where violence is imminent, the same speech act may constitute
unprotected fighting words.
In RAV v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 381 (1992), the U.S. Supreme Court
unanimously found that a St. Paul, Minnesota ordinance that criminally punished persons
who placed on public or private property objects or words they knew or should have
known would "arouse anger or resentment in others on the basis of race, color, creed,
religion, or gender" violated the Free Speech Clause. Writing for a five justice majority,
Justice Scalia accepted the Minnesota Supreme Court's interpretation that the ordinance
reached only fighting words, and announced that even though the ordinance applied only
to proscribable fighting words, it was nonetheless facially unconstitutional because it "pro-
hibited otherwise permitted speech solely on the basis of the subjects the speech
addresses." Id. He concluded that the ordinance discriminated on the basis of content
because it "applie[d] only to 'fighting words' that insult, or provoke violence, 'on the basis
of race, color, creed, religion or gender,'" thereby leaving unpunished "displays containing
abusive invective, no matter how vicious or severe ... unless they were addressed to one of
the specific disfavored topics." Id. at 391.
Perkins states that it is "with remarkable uniformity that even words generally re-
garded as 'fighting words' in the community have no recognition as adequate provocation
in the eyes of the law." ROLLIN M. PERKINS, PERKINS ON CRIMINAL LAW § I (2d ed. 1969).
It is noted that:
[Miere words or gestures, however offensive, insulting, or abusive they may
be, are not, according to the great weight of authority, adequate to reduce a
homicide, although committed in a passion provoked by them, from murder
to manslaughter, especially when the homicide was intentionally committed
with a deadly weapon ....
40 C.J.S. Homicide § 47 (1944) (citations omitted); see also 40 AM.JuR. 2D Homicide § 64
(1968).
While it is unclear whether this statement actually reflects the current state of the
law of provocation, it is worth considering whether "fighting words" may operate to miti-
gate murder to manslaughter in doctrine akin to, but distinct from, provocation such as
diminished capacity and extreme emotional disturbance. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315
U.S. 568, 572 (1942) placed fighting words outside the coverage of the First Amendment
on a per se basis. According to this approach, there is a category of "fighting words" that,
because of their content, do not constitute speech at all.Therefore, any restriction on such
"speech" is constitutionally permissible.
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In the lexicon of racial abuses, there are many words and phrases ca-
pable of inflicting physiological and mental injury. Even absent
accompanying conduct, the use of some words can inflict deep wounds
based on identity, be that identity based on race, gender, culture, religion,
or sexuality] The excerpt from the X-rated decision outlined above is but
one example of the violent and abusive words that many Americans are
exposed to from an early age. The perpetrators who deal in this vitriol
and its symbolism (such as racist graffiti or anti-Semitic imagery) are well
aware of its powerful potential-they select and deploy the imagery with
care to assure maximum damage to their victims.
Hateful speech and racially violent symbolism, such as that in
Bohanon, are symptoms of social processes. They are the legacy of a past of
racialized nation-building. The First Amendment is designed to protect
political speech of all types, yet speech that infringes on public order (such
as bomb threats, incitements to riot, obscene phone calls, and "fighting
words") can be prohibited in the interest of the common good.8 More-
over, even absent a constitutional reclassification of hate speech and
racially violent symbolism as fighting words, there is conceptual space in
the criminal law to consider the impact-driven legal significance of such
racial abuse. Examination of the defenses of provocation, extreme emo-
tional disturbance, and diminished capacity might prove informative and
provide an equitable point of departure when informed by the social sci-
ences. Specifically, the elasticity of the reasonable person standard in the
defense of provocation, the recognition of trauma in the extreme emo-
tional disturbance defense, and the allowance for impairment in
diminished capacity provide opportunities to consider the role of racism
in criminal culpability determinations.
While the abusive letter reproduced above undoubtedly engendered
both physiological and mental effects on its intended victims, if the family
members had responded with violence to such abuse, they would have
6. The prevalence of the use of words as weapons is revealed by the incidence of
such words triggering litigation. A simple Lexis search of the term "Black bitch" received
211 hits, "nigger" received in excess of 3000 hits, "cunt" received 336 hits, "squaw" re-
ceived 594 hits, "spic" received 261 hits, "chink" received 279 hits, "kike" received 91,
"gook" received 115 hits, "coon" received in excess of 3000 hits, "porch monkey" received
27 hits, "jigaboo" received 9 hits, "faggot" received 550 hits, "fag" received 588 hits, "slut"
received 676, "nip" received 833 hits, "wetback" received 189 hits, and "mooley" received
26 hits (Lexis search Dec. 7, 2003) (on file with author) [hereinafter Lexis search].
7. See generally WORDS THAT WOUND: CRITICAL RACE THEORY, ASSAULTIVE SPEECH,
AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT (Mar J. Matsuda et al. eds., 1993) [hereinafter WoRDs THAT
WOUND].
8. See PATRICIA HILL COLLINS, FIGHTING WORDS: BLACK WOMEN AND THE SEARCH
FOR JUSTICE 84 (1998).
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been denied access to criminal law defenses! It is, however, possible to
recognize such speech and symbolism as a form of racial violence that,
like all forms of violence, inflicts both physical and mental damage upon
its victims and might lead to responsive violence. It is this point-the
prospect of responsive violence-from which this Article departs.
This article will examine the concept of racist words, symbols, and
actions that are used as weapons to "ambush, terrorize, wound, humiliate,
and degrade"' ° as psychological and physiological violence. The implica-
tions of such violence are relevant to several affirmative defenses and,
indeed, to the initial formulation of mens rea. The historical and contex-
tual legacy that is intentionally invoked by the utilization of racialized
violence is what separates the racial epithet or racially violent symbolism
from other distressing insults and slurs. While First Amendment" protec-
tion extends to offensive or insulting speech, the mental and physical
sequelae of such speech, even absent conduct, are appropriate considera-
tions for the criminal law, as such speech is racial violence itself and may
lead to the responsive physical violence that is beyond the protection of
the First Amendment.
1 2
Words used as weapons to inflict maximum damage upon racially
designated victims should be distinguished from violent speech in the
abstract as such targeted utterances intentionally draw upon a history of
racist terrorism. 13 In the face of such violence, courts should respond in
9. In Bohanon, the Walkers testified as to their fear, humiliation, and embarrassment.
They changed their behavior, becoming much more cautious than they had been. United
States v. Bohanon, 290 E 3d 869, 876 (7th Cir. 2002). Note that these are not the victims'
real names.The Court changed them to spare the victims further embarrassment. Id.
10. WORDS THAT WOUND, supra note 7, at 1.
11. While so much of the debate surrounding racist symbolism and expression fo-
cuses on the constitutional law implications, legal analysis should simultaneously consider
the physical and mental sequelae of racialized terrorism and its implications for criminal
law. Recent history has taught us that this sentiment of heightened vulnerability in the
face of violence and terror is real and normal.
12. See Michael J. Mannheimer, Note, The Fighting Words Doctrine, 93 COLUM. L.
REV. 1527 (1993).
13. Indeed, for Blacks and many people of color, much of America history has been
racially violent and terror filled. See generally MARK BAUERLEIN, NEGROPIHOBIA: A RACE
RIOT IN ATLANTA, 1906 (2002) (discussing the 1906 Atlanta race riot where Whites carved
their initials in the backs of their Black victims); ALFREDL. BROPHY, RECONSTRUCTING THE
DREAMLAND,THE TULSA RIOT OF 1921: RACE, REPARATIONS, AND RECONCILIATION (2002)
(describing how the "Black Wall Street" section of Tulsa was laid to ashes by angry White
mobs which left over 150 Blacks dead, 30 city blocks destroyed, and over seven thousand
Blacks homeless); PHILLIP DRAY, AT THE HANDS OF PERSONS UNKNOWN:THE LYNCHING OF
BLACK AMERICA (2003) (documenting in vivid detail the history of lynching of Blacks in
America between 1882 and 1962); MICHAEL D'ORSO, LIKE JUDGMENT DAY:THE RUIN AND
REDEMPTION OF A TOWN CALLED ROSEWOOD (1996) (detailing how the 150 residents of
Rosewood, Florida were chased into the swamps while their homes, stores, and churches
were burned to the ground following the alleged rape of a White woman); LEON E LIT-
WACK, TROUBLE IN MIND: BLACK SOUTHERNERS IN THE AGE OF JIM CROW (1998)
FALL 2003]
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one of two ways: prohibition or regulation of such speech or, as this Arti-
cle will argue, acknowledgement of the mitigatory potential of
provocation, diminished capacity, and extreme emotional disturbance for
victims of racialized violence. These defenses have been effectively used
by jealous husbands, homophobes, and those claiming the sanctity of their
cultural practices. Accordingly, there is no tenable basis to deny these de-
fenses to persons of color who are provoked to respond to racialized
violence. If a victim, such as the recipient of the above quoted letter, re-
sponds by self-help to the racialized violence inflicted upon her, legal
recognition of the material impact of such racial terrorism, and the vio-
lence done to a victim so abused, is in order for purposes of mitigated
sentencing.
Part I of this Article explores the salience of "critical psychology,"14
focusing on the mental, and to a lesser extent the physiological, implica-
tions of exposure to racism. Part II explores the criminal law doctrines of
extreme emotional disturbance, provocation, and diminished capacity as
substantive areas capable of incorporating critical psychology. Part III ana-
lyzes the pros and cons of an infusion of the critical psychology into the
criminal law for communities of color. This part focuses on the potential
pathologization of Blacks 5 as "mad" or "bad," as well as considerations of
intersectionality and multidimensionality.
(describing the genital mutilation, stabbing, and burning alive of a Black man as over 2000
White onlookers cheered); STEWART E.TOLNAY & E.M. BECK, A FESTIvAL OF VIOLENCE: AN
ANALYSIS OF SOUTHERN LYNCHINGS, 1882-1930 (1995) (documenting the murder of 2500
Blacks in ten southern states over the course of six decades); DINA TEMPLE-RASTON, A
DEATH IN TExAs: A STORY OF RACE, MURDER AND A SMALL TOWN'S STRUGGLE FOR REDEMP-
TION (2002) (the 1998 account of three White men who chained a Black man to their
truck and dragged him for three miles to his death in Jasper, Texas); HERBERT S. KLEIN, THE
ATLANTIC SLAVE TRADE (1999) (empirical evidence regarding the social, political, and eco-
nomic impact of the 27,224 trans-Atlantic slave voyages between 1562 and 1867).
It is specifically because of the history of racialized terror that racist symbolism and
racist speech have such abusive potency as forms of violence. Many Blacks and people of
color perceive such imagery and expression as profoundly assaultive--they are not abstract
random acts or utterances.
14. 1 have referenced critical psychology as that subcategory of the discipline that
responds to the traditionally assumed universality of experience by recognizing the subjec-
tivity of experience, especially as this psychical experience is impacted and determined by
societal factors including race, gender, sexual orientation, class, culture, religion and the
intersection of these realities. Hence, critical psychology recognizes and addresses the so-
cial and political constructs that impact mental, and therefore physical, health and
disparately affect those relegated to the margins of society.
15. While I prefer the term Black, as I find it to be more inclusive of the diversity of
persons of color and avoids confusion with, for instance, Whites from the continent of
Africa, I will use the term African American where appropriate. I believe Blackness to be
an identity framework which includes, but is not limited to, African Americans,West Indi-
ans, Brazilians, Africans and Latinos/Latinas. African American is, therefore, a subset of
Black identity.
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I. CRITICAL PSYCHOLOGY AND RACISM AS ABUSE
"I had to meet the [W]hite man's eyes. An unfamiliar weight
burdened me. In the [W]hite world the man of colour encounters
difficulties in the development of his bodily scheme. ... I was battered
down by tom-toms, cannibalism, intellectual deficiency, fetishism, racial
defects .... I took myselffar offfrom my own presence.... What else
could it befor me but an amputation, an excision, a hemorrhage that
spattered my whole body with [Bilack blood?'
16
The study of abuse and its consequences has preoccupied many
mental health practitioners throughout the last century. The repercussions
of abuse are not limited to the manifestations of physical battery. Rather,
like the many forms of abuse, there are many consequences.
The recognition of racism as abuse is consistent with traditional and
contemporary definitions. 7 Mental health practitioners have identified
common consequences of exposure to mental and physical abuse, includ-
ing psychological sequelae, which some believe are even more serious
than the physical effects.' 8 In domestic violence cases, for instance, the
abuse often erodes women's self-esteem and puts them at a greater risk for
a variety of mental health problems, including depression, post-traumatic
stress disorder, anxiety disorders, suicide, and alcohol and drug addiction.' 9
Such abuse has additional consequences for families. Children who wit-
ness marital violence face increased risk for emotional and behavioral
problems including anxiety, depression, poor school performance, low
16. FRANz FANON, BLACK SKIN WHITE MASKS 110-12 (Charles Lam Markmann
trans. 1967).
17. Indeed, the following dictionary definitions of abuse provide ample opportunity
for the commencement of a dialogue concerning the nature of racism and how to define
the consequences flowing from its perpetuation. For instance, the American Heritage Dic-
tionary defines abuse as the following: "To use wrongly or improperly; misuse: abuse a
privilege;" "To hurt or injure by maltreatment; ill-use;" "To force sexual activity on; rape
or molest;" "To assail with contemptuous, coarse, or insulting words; revile." AMERICAN
HERITAGE DICTIONARY (4th ed. 2002). Interestingly, these definitions were found at the
Abuse Support Center site of Mental-health-matters.com. Mental-Health-Matters.com,
Abuse Support Center: Definition ofAbuse, at http://www.mental-health-matters.com/abuse/
index.php (last visited Dec. 8, 2003); f Merriam-Webster Dictionary Online, at http://
www.m-w.com/cgi-bin/dictionary (last visited Oct. 23, 2003) (defining abuse as "a cor-
rupt practice or custom; improper or excessive use or treatment; obsolete: a deceitful act;
language that condemns or vilifies usually unjustly, intemperately, and angrily; physical
maltreatment").
18. See The Johns Hopkins School of Public Health, Ending Violence Against Women,
27 POPULATION REP. Ch. 5.3 (1999), http://www.jhuccp.org/pr/lll/Illchap5_3.shtm
(last visited Oct. 23, 2003).
19. Id.
Michigan.Journal of Race & Law
self-esteem, disobedience, nightmares, and physical health complaints.2 °
Children exposed to abuse are also more likely to act aggressively.]
Critical psychology reveals widespread racial discrimination against
Blacks.22 Studies have found that Blacks continue to be discriminated
against in a variety of arenas, ranging from face-to-face interactions to
• 23
discrimination in housing, health, and social services. Such discrimina-
tion is not limited to low-income or uneducated Blacks, but is also
reported by Black middle-class professionals.24 Indeed, one analysis draw-
ing on the National Study of Black Americans suggests that recent
20. See David R.Williams et al., Racial Differences in Physical and Mental Health: Socio-
economic Status, Stress and Discrimination, 2 J. HEALTH PSYCHOL. 335, 342 (1997).
21. See The Johns Hopkins School of Public Health, supra note 18, at ch. 5.4.
22. See Elizabeth Klonoff et al., Racial Discrimination and Psychiatric Symptoms Among
Blacks, 5 CULTURAL DIVERSITY & ETHNIC MINORITY PSYCHOL. 329,329 (1999).
23. See id.; see also DERRICK BELL, FACES AT THE BOTTOM OF THE WELL: THE PERMA-
NENCE OF RACISM (1992); THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF INTERPERSONAL DISCRIMINATION
(Bernice Lott & Diane Maluso eds., 1995).
24. See ELLIS COSE, THE RAGE OF A PRIVILEGED CLASS (1993); see also JoE R. FEAGIN
& MELVIN P. SIKES, LIVING WITH RACISM: THE BLACK MIDDLE-CLASS EXPERIENCE 12-17
(1994). Feagin and Sikes state:
In contrast to the common [Wihite view, few middle-class African Ameri-
cans interviewed for Living with Racism see the significance of racism in their
lives declining. Indeed, in the late 1980s and early 1990s many African
Americans perceive an increase in the significance of race. The first of these
general propositions is that modern racism must be understood as lived ex-
perience. When our respondents talk about being [Bilack in a country
dominated by [W]hites, they do not speak in abstract concepts of discrimina-
tion or racism learned only from books, but tell of mistreatment encountered
as they traverse traditionally [W]hite places.
A second proposition gleaned from the interviews is that experiences with
serious discrimination not only are very painful and stressful in the immedi-
ate situation and aftermath but also have a cumulative impact on particular
individuals, their families, and their communities. A [Biblack person's life is
regularly disrupted by the mistreatment suffered personally or by family
members.
The third generalization we suggest is that the repeated experience of racism
significantly affects a [B]lack person's behavior and understanding of life.
A fourth proposition we offer is that the daily experiences of racial hostility
and discrimination encountered by middle-class and other African Ameri-
cans are the constituent elements of the interlocking societal structures and
processes called "institutionalized racism."
[VOL. 9:77
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experiences with racial discrimination may be associated with "higher
levels of chronic health problems, disability and psychological distress, and
lower levels of happiness and life satisfaction. 25 Membership in the Black
race has been described as entailing exposure to highly stressful experi-
ences, triggered essentially by race."6
While education alone does not diminish the discrimination experi-
enced by Blacks in America, Blacks are 1.6 times more likely than Whites
to have completed less than twelve years of education. Education is posi-
28tively related to well-being. - A similar pattern is evident for income.
The racial distribution by social class follows the pattern noted for educa-
tion and income. Blacks are more likely than Whites to be workers (61
percent vs. 51 percent); equivalent percentages of Blacks and Whites are
supervisors, but Whites are almost twice as likely as Blacks to be managers
(24 percent vs. 13 percent). 29 Blacks are more than twice as likely as
Whites to report major experiences of discrimination in employment and
police interactions.0 Levels of financial stress are significantly higher for
Blacks than for Whites. 3' Further, poverty and ethnicity have been found
to be two of the most important consequential factors contributing to
32
stress.
Critical psychology has expanded models of stress to account for ra-
cially predicated social hierarchies and the mechanisms through which
they contribute to differences in mental and physical health. Unlike tradi-
tional psychology, critical psychology makes the implicit explicit by
acknowledging race-related mental health issues. Critical psychology ex-
plicitly recognizes that race, ethnicity, social class, conmmunity, family, and
work environment are independent contributors to the chronic stress bur-
den of a racialized person. This chronic stress burden, which has
25. JOE R. FEAGIN & KARYN D. McKINNEY, THE MANv COSTS OF RACISM 54 (2003).
26. See Hector F. Myers, Holistic Definitions and Measurements of States of Non-Health,
in AFRICAN PHILOSOPHY: ASSUMPTION AND PARADIGMS FOR RESEARCH ON BLACK PERSONS
(Lewis M. King et al. eds., 1976).
27. College graduates enjoy higher levels of psychological well-being than do peo-
ple with less education. Consideration of education reduces racial differences in well-being
by more than 20 percent. There are no racial differences in the middle of the education
distribution (high school graduation, some college), but Whites are almost twice as likely
as African Americans to have graduated from college.Williams et al., supra note 20, at 343.
28. Blacks are almost four times as likely as Whites to have a total annual income of
less than $10,000 (21 percent vs. 6 percent) and are 1.4 times more likely than Whites to
be in the $10,000-$29,999 range. Equivalent percentages of Blacks and Whites are in the
middle-income category ($30,000-$59,999), but Whites are 2.5 times more likely than
Blacks to have incomes over $60,000 (41 percent vs. 16 percent). The lower average in-
come of Blacks provides for households that on average are significantly larger than those
ofWhites. !d. at 341.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id.
FALL 2003]
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cumulative implications, includes both generic life stresses and ethnicity
and race-related stresses.3 A racially disparate vicious circle is generated
which contributes over time to cumulative vulnerability.a4 This in turn
creates disparate vulnerabilities to mental and physical disease and dys-
function.3 s
Mental health implications of racial abuse reveal several points of
departure including stress, distress, the humiliation dynamic, anxiety, and
depression, and coping. This Article will examine stress, distress, coping,
and the humiliation dynamic as points of departure within the critical
psychology for incorporation into mitigatory criminal law defenses.
33. This chronic burden of stress is hypothesized as contributing to disease through
a biological pathway that includes the triggering of physiological response mechanisms,
constitutional predispositions or vulnerabilities, and wear and tear on the system. Id. at
348.
34. Hans Selye first proposed the notion that stress exposure may have a damaging
effect on physical health in 1956. According to Selye, individuals who experience "general
adaptation syndrome" (GAS), respond to stressful events with nonspecific physiological
responses that, over time, produce wear and tear on the system. See HANs SELYE, THE
STRESS OF LIFE (1956). Selye argued that repeated cycling through the stress response
would eventually lead to damage to the organism. See id.
More recently, McEwen and Stellar coined the term "allostasis" to refer to the
normal fluctuations of certain body systems that maintain stability and "provide protection
to the body by responding to internal and external stress." B.S. McEwen & E. Stellar, Stress
and the Individual: Mechanisms Leading to Disease, 153 ARCHIVES INTERNA. MED. 2093
(1993). The most common allostatic responses involve the activation of the sympathetic
nervous system and hypothalamic-pituitary-adrenal (HPA) axis and the resulting release of
stress hormones. A normal stress response involves the activation of these systems (such as
stress hormones mobilize the body for action by increasing heart rate, blood pressure, and
respiration, and also mobilize the immune system to protect against infection), and subse-
quent deactivation once the stressors are removed or reduced. However, when deactivation
is insufficient or incomplete, there is prolonged exposure to stress hormones. Over time,
this exposure results in an increase in allostatic load, indicating the physiological costs of
overtaxing these systems.
According to McEwen, allostatic load is increased under four conditions: (a) fre-
quent stress exposure, which promotes frequent exposure to stress hormones; (b)
inadequate habituation to stressful experiences, which also results in prolonged exposure
to stress hormones; (c) inability to recover, in which physiological arousal and reactivity
continue even after the stressor has been removed or terminated; and (d) system fatigue or
dysfunction, which triggers pathological compensatory responses in other systems. Bruce
S. McEwen, Protective and Damaging Effects of Stress Mediators, 338 NEw ENG. J. MED. 172,
172-75 (1998).
35. Stress, biological processes' and disease pathways are influenced by a number of
psychosocial and behavioral factors, including psychological characteristics (such as per-
sonal dispositions), lifestyle factors (such as diet, exercise, smoking, or substance use), stress
appraisal, coping strategies, and the availability of social resources. All of these factors oper-
ating synergistically over time result in differential health status and disparate trajectories
for racial and ethnic groups.Williams et al., supra note 20, at 385-91.
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A. Stress and Distress
Stress has been defined as "environmental demands that tax or ex-
ceed the adaptive capacity of an organism, resulting in biological and
psychological changes that may be detrimental and place the organism at
risk for disease., 36 Essentially, stress is now recognized as harms, threats,
and challenges, the quality and intensity of which depend on personal
agendas, resources and vulnerabilities of the person, and environmental
conditions.37 Stressful life events have been characterized as those situa-
tions that are tension producing and could adversely affect an individual's
mental health, while distress is the state that occurs when the individual is
unable to cope effectively with the stressor.38
These definitions exemplify a shift in psychological theory from a
focus on environmental inputs and outputs to a relational assessment of
stress and its impact.39 This shift in focus to the subject experiencing stress
implies a knowing person who construes or appraises the significance of
what is happening with regard to his or her well-being. This shift also re-
quires an approach to stress measurement that takes into account the
personal and environmental variables that influence the appraisal process.
Over the past decade, critical psychologists have researched the well-
established relationship between race and psychological distress. Specifi-
cally, critical psychology has revealed that race differences in psychological
distress are particularly pronounced among people with low incomes.
Blacks in America report lower levels of well-being than do Whites. 40 Eve-
ryday discrimination and higher levels of stress are positively related to
poorer health status.4 1
Critical psychological findings are consistent with sociological find-
ings that social conditions are important determinants of variations in
health.42 High levels of stress and low socio-economic status ("SES") 43 are
36. See Sheldon Cohen et al., Strategies for Measuring Stress in Studies of Psychiatric and
Physical Disorders, in MEASURING STRESS: A GUIDE FOR HEALTH AND SocIAL SCIENTISTS 3
(Sheldon Cohen et al. eds., 1995).
37. See Richard S. Lazarus, Puzzles in the Study Of Daily Hassles, 7 J. BEHAV. MED.
375 (1984).
38. See Judith G. Rabkin & Elmer L. Struening, Life Events, Stress, and Illness, 194
SCIENCES 1013, 1013-20 (1976);Vetta L. Sanders Thompson, Perceived Experiences of Racism
as Stressful Life Events, 32 COMMUNITY MENTAL HEALTH J. 223, 224-25 (1996).
39. Lazarus, supra note 37.
40. "Well-being" is loosely defined as a harmonious fit between the person and his
or her environment. See Lazarus, supra note 37, at 376. Women report higher levels of psy-
chological distress than men.Williams et al., supra note 20.
41. Id.
42. See FEAGIN & McKiNNEY, supra note 25, at 39-64.
43. SES includes income, education, and occupation.
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two social factors that have been identified as pathogenic. 4 Education and
especially income, two of the three considerations for SES, are related to
health outcomes and play a major role in explaining racial differences in
health.45
The fact is, however, that poor income positioning, occupational
status, and educational achievement disparately impact racialized persons.46
That is, SES is itself racially corrupted. This intersection of class and race
is particularly important for the criminal law defenses discussed herein in
light of the fact that race-related stress is more strongly related to indica-
tors of mental health than to indicators of physical health. 7 The research
relating to social class, as an additional factor impacting stress is equally
important to racialized people because of the "colored" face of American
poverty48 Accordingly, those most affected by the additive or interactive
nature of race and poverty are the focus of this Article. In fact, critical psy-
chologists have demonstrated that Blacks are more distressed than Whites
49
even at low levels of income.
Differences in physical health may be due, at least in part, to differ-
ential exposure to chronic and acute life stressors.s 0 Blacks, especially those
from lower social classes, often report a greater number of negative life
events5l and greater and more frequent exposure to "generic life stress-
44. Williams et al., supra note 20, 347 ("At the same time, the findings are consistent
with a large body of work that suggests the societal conditions are important determinants
of variables in health."); see also id. at 341 ("The interplay of race, socio-economic status,
stress and disease is hypothesized to result in cumulative bio-behavioral vulnerability over
the life span ... [which] accounts, at least in part, for the cross-generational persistence of
the health disparities that is documented in the epidemiological literature.").
45. Id.
46. Sarah Staveteig & Alyssa Wigton, Racial and Ethnic Disparities: Key Findings from
the National Survey of America's Families, at http://www.urban.org/url.cfi?ID=309308
(Feb. 2000); Chris Bailey, 77he Misrepresentations of the Black Male, at http://gasou.edu/
-cbarley3/occupational.html.
47. See Williams et al., supra note 20, at 348.
48. See generally TODD SWANSTROM ET AL., PLACE MATTERS: METROPOLITICS FOR THE
TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY (2001); MICHAEL HARRINGTON, THE OTHER AMERICA: POVERTY IN
THE UNITED STATES (rev. ed. 1981).
49. Ronald C. Kessler & Harold W Neighbors, A New Perspective on the Relationships
Among Race, Social Class, and Psychological Distress, 27 J. HEALTH & SOc. BEHAV. 107, 113
(1986).
50. See Arline T. Geronimus, The Weathering Hypothesis and the Health of African
American Women and Infants: Evidence and Speculations, 2 ETHNICITY & DISEASE 207, 209-17
(1992);Williams et al., supra note 20.
51. See Philip H. G. Ituarte et al., Psychosocial Mediators of Racial Differences in Night-
time Blood Pressure Dipping Among Normotensive Adults, 18 HEALTH PSYCHOL. 393, 393-94,
399-400 (1999).
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ors." 2 Blacks also tend to perceive these events as more stressful and re-
port greater psychological distress from these stressful life experiences
than their White counterparts.13 As such, Blacks are likely to be particu-
larly vulnerable to the long-term effects of high allostatic load"4 because of
their relative socio-political position. Chronic or cumulative stressors may
trigger physiological response mechanisms, predispositions, and wear and
tear on the system. s Chronic stressors due to financial strain, inadequate
housing, crowding, and violence may all contribute to more frequent acti-
vation of stress-response systems and prolonged exposure to stress
hormones5 6
This compounding of race and class is consistent with critical race
theorists' scholarship on intersectionality." For Blacks in America, the in-
tersection of race and class produces an experience of oppression that is
greater than the sum of its parts.5 8 Accordingly, it makes sense that critical
psychology has demonstrated that poverty compounds and exacerbates
the effects of racism and vice versa. When the interactive effects of race
and class are taken into consideration, the data show that race has a sub-
stantial effect on psychological functioning among lower-class people, a
result that is consistent with the view that racial discrimination exacer-
bates the health-damaging effects of poverty among Blacks .
Irrespective of the type of analysis conducted, race discrimination
has emerged as a powerful predictor of Blacks' psychiatric symptoms at all
levels of socio-economic status. Indeed, in keeping with the findings of
Cose,60 Feagin, and Sikes, critical psychologists Kessler and Neighbors
have explained that:
52. This refers to stressors that are a usual part of modern life-financial, occupa-
tional, relationship, parental. See Elizabeth A. Klonoffet al., supra note 22, at 330.
53. Collins et al., African American Mothers' Perceptions of Their Residential Environnent,
Stressful Live Events, and Very Low Birthweight, 9 EPIDEMIOLOGY 286 (1998); Hector E Myers,
Stress, Ethnicity and Social Class:A Model for Research on Black populations, in MINORITY MEN-
TAL HEALTH 118-48 (Enrico E.Jones & Sheldon J. Korchin eds., 1982).
54. "Allostatic load" is a psychological term that recognizes the chronic burden of
stress as contributing to disease through biological pathways. See supra note 34.
55. See HANDBOOK OF RACIAL AND ETHNIc MINORITY PSYCHOLOGY 382 (Guillermo
Bernal et al. eds., 2002).
56. Norman B. Anderson et al., A Contextual Model for Research of Race Differences in
Autonomic Reactivity, in PERSONALITY, ELEVATED BLOOD PRESSURE AND ESSENTIAL HYPER-
TENSION 197-216 (Ernest H.Johnson et al. eds., 1992).
57. Professor Kimberl6 Crenshaw states that "because the intersectional experience
is greater than the sum of racism and sexism, any analysis that does not take intersectional-
ity into account cannot sufficiently address the particular manner in which Black women
are subordinated." Kimberl6 Crenshaw, Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and Sex: A
Black Feminist Critique of Antidiscrintination Doctrine, Feminist Theory and Antiracist Politics, U.
CHI. LEGAL F 139, 140 (1989).
58. Id.
59. Kessler & Neighbors, supra note 49, at 108.
60. See infra note 24.
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It is also possible that the joint effects of poverty and discrimi-
nation have synergistic effects or that financial success
functions to shield blacks from the more distressing aspects of
discrimination. Any of these processes would lead to an inter-
action in which the effects of race are most pronounced at the
lower end of the social class distribution.
Alternatively, race differences in distress could be most pro-
nounced at high levels of social class, because financially
successful Black-group members might experience the psy-
chological stresses associated with this marginal position.
Inferential evidence consistent with this possibility was re-
ported in a treatment study ....
• 62
In stepwise regressions, racist discrimination was the best predictor
of half of the symptoms measured, including somatization, anxiety, obses-
sive compulsiveness, interpersonal sensitivity, and depression. Racial
discrimination was a more powerful predictor of those symptoms than
63 64generic stressors such as social status.63 In hierarchical regressions, racist
61. Id. (emphasis added). They further state:
It might be that the pronounced distress among lower-class [B]lacks as com-
pared to that of lower-class [Wihites is due to the greater proportion of
[B]lacks than [W]hites with thwarted mobility aspirations. It has been found
that high distress among lower-class [B]lacks was associated with high goal-
striving stress. Other explanations are possible. For example, the joint effects
of poverty and discrimination might have synergistic effects that explain the
comparatively high distress scores of lower-class [Bilacks, or certain resources
for coping with stress might be less readily available to lower-class [Bilacks
than to lower-class [W]hites.
See id. at 113.
62. When there are a large number of regressors, a computer is sometimes pro-
grammed to introduce them one at a time, in a so-called "stepwise regression." The order
in which the regressors are introduced may be determined in several ways. Two of the
most common ways are: (1) The statistician may specify a priori the order in which the
regressors are to be introduced. For example, among many other regressors suppose there
were three dummy variables to take care of four different geographical regions; then it
would make sense to introduce these three dummy variables together in succession, with-
out interruption from other regressors; (2) The statistician may want to let the data
determine the order, using one of the many available computer programs (with names
such as "backward elimination," "forward selection" or "all possible subsets"). THOMAS H.
WONNACOTT & RONOLD J. WONNACOTT, INTRODUCTORY STATISTICS FOR BUSINESS AND
ECONoMics 499 (4th ed. 1990).
63. Klonoff et al., supra note 22, at 335.
64. Hierarchical regression attempts to improve standard regression estimates by
adding a second-stage "prior" regression to an ordinary model. This regression yields
semi-Bayes relative risk estimates by using a second-stage model to pull estimates toward
each other when the corresponding variables have similar levels. Unlike classical Bayesian
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discrimination was more significantly correlated to these symptoms than
were contextual factors such as age, gender, education, social class, and
generic stressors. 6' Despite the enormous variability in the social class lev-
els of Blacks researched (for example, some were high school dropouts on
welfare, others had law degrees and six-figure incomes), findings indicate
that racism may play a role that is as large as, or larger than, social class.66
Social class marginalization exacerbates stress due to the compound-
ing effects of racism.67 As Krieger has stated, "race conditions social class
such that exposure to generic life stressors are not greater among the
lower classes, but at equivalent levels of Socio-Econonic Status, racialized
, ,68persons experience higher stress burdens and poorer health outcomes.
This relationship between race and SES can have direct disparate effects
on health in the form of additional stress burden and higher allostatic
load,69 as well as indirect effects in the form of structural barriers to health
care and other social resources.70 While blatant acts of racism and
analysis, however, no use is made of previous studies. Compared with results obtained
with one-stage conditional maximum-likelihood logistic regression, our hierarchical re-
gression model gives more stable and plausible estimates. In particular, certain effects with
implausible maximum-likehhood estimates have more reasonable semi-Bayes estimates.
See generally J.S. Witte et al., Hierarchical Regression Analysis Applied to a Study of Multiple
Dietary Exposures and Breast Cancer, 5 EPIDEMIOLOGY 612 (1994).
65. Klonoffet al., supra note 22, at 335.
66. Id. at 337.
67. Nancy Krieger et al., Racism, Sexism, and Social Class: Implications for Studies of
Health, Disease, and Well-Being, 9 AM.J. PREVENTIVE MED. 82, 93-99 (Supp. 1993).
68. Id.; see also David R. Williams, Race, Socioeconomic Status, and Health: The Added
Effects of Racism and Discrimination, in SOCIOECONOMIC STATUS AND HEALTH IN INDUSTRIAL
NATIONS 173-88 (Nancy E.Adler et al. eds., 1999).
In addition to conditioning generic life stresses, racial abuses also contribute to
greater stress burdens through additional stresses that are specifically related to being a
member of a racialized community. For example, in a recent study examining the effects of
social class, racism, and stress on the self-reported physical and mental health of 520 Whites
and 586 Blacks in Detroit, it was determined that both race-related stressors and general
life stressors significantly account for racial differences in physical health status. Black status
stresses make a significant additional contribution to the level of psychological distress
experienced beyond that accounted for by generic life stresses that all students and young
adults experience. Williams et al., supra note 20; see also Brian D. Smedley et al., Minority-
Status Stresses and the College Adjustment of Ethnic Minority Freshmen, 64 J. HIGHER EDUC.
434 (1993) (finding similar results in three studies testing this hypothesis on Black college
students and young adults); Norma Rodriguez et al., Latino College Student Adjustment:
Does an Increased Presence Offset Minority-Status and Acculturative Stress?, 30 J. APPLIED SOC.
PSYCHOL. 1523, 1548 (2000) (finding that Latinos experience additional stresses as a result
of their cultural group affiliation). These studies also indicate that Black students evidence
greater sensitivity to race-related stressors than Chicano, Latino, and Filipino students and
that being the numerical majority in a large university does not reduce the additional
burden of Black-status stresses experienced by Latino students. See Smedley et al., supra.
69. See infra note 34.
70. These effects include: access to housing, employment, and, safety; acceptance of
a societal stigma of inferiority (such as acceptance of Black status); high-risk unhealthy
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discrimination might be less commonplace today, more common insidi-
ous and aversive forms of racism have evolved.71 As Calmore points out:
During the 1980s and 1990s, it appears that American racism
had become known throughout the world as "state of the art."
Its picaresque genius lay in developing so brilliantly the con-
ception that it had disappeared except as it was "imagined" by
its subordinated subjects, who continued to "suffer" in an un-
believable world-a color blind world of white innocence.
Race neutrality, or "racism in drag" (to quote Pat Williams)
had displaced race consciousness.72
What are known as micro-aggressions in the critical race theory lit-
73 7
erature, or the battery of hyper-visibility or ascribed otherness,74 might
lifestyles; and negative affective states (such as depression hostility, dispositional pessimism).
See generally Rodney Clark et al., Racism as a Stressor for African Americans: A Biopsychosocial
model, 54 Am. PSYCHOLOGIST 805 (1999); Krieger et al., supra note 67;Williams, supra note
68.
71. See Charles R. Lawrence, III, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning with
Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317 (1987) (analyzing the law's singular recognition of
intentional, as opposed to unconscious racial animus and arguing that by recognizing only
explicitly articulated, intentional, conscious racism, American anti-discrimination law itself
embodies a form ofWhite privilege).
72. John 0. Calmore, The Case of the Speluncian Explorers: Contemporary Proceedings,
61 GEO.WASH. L. REV. 1764, 1776 (1993).
73. See e.g., Peggy C. Davis, Law as Microagqression, in LAW AS CRITICAL RACE THE-
ORY:THE CUTTING EDGE 170 (Richard Delgado ed., 1995).Another measure, which is akin
to the notion of racism as micro-aggression, takes account of everyday discrimination and
attempts to measure more chronic, routine, and relatively minor experiences of unfair
treatment. It sums nine items that capture the frequency of the following experiences in
the day-to-day lives of respondents: being treated with less courtesy than others; being
treated with less respect than others; receiving poorer service than others in restaurants or
stores; people acting as if you are not smart; people acting as if they are better than you;
people thinking you are dishonest; being called names or insulted; and being threatened or
harassed. Examples of such cumulative behavior include making exclusionary decisions in
college admissions and employment, treating successful Blacks as exceptions that prove the
rule of Black inferiority, and the randomized disparate treatment that a person of color
may encounter from the bus to the boardroom. See Williams et al., supra note 20, at 341;
John F Dovidio & Samuel L. Gaertner, Aversive Racism and Selection Decisions: 1989 and
1999, 11 PSYCHOL. SCIENCE 315 (2000).
74. I use the term "ascribed otherness" to delineate the fact that there are conse-
quences that flow from how we are perceived and interpreted by the observer. That process
of interpretation-the "what are you" question and subsequent judgtuent-based not only
on one's self-conceptualization and performance of identity, but on how others perceive
one's identity and performance-this is the "what one is thought to be" reference point. For
instance, if an observer thinks that a person is a lesbian, he or she may treat that individual
differently, whether or not the person actually is a lesbian. Sikh Americans and others who
are deemed to "look" Arab or who are thought to be Muslim are painfully aware of this
ascribed otherness in the wake of 9/11. See generally Human Rights Watch, Hate Crimes in the
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now represent the preferred manner of discrimination and racial abuse of
persons of color. The cumulative impact of nicro-aggressions, those daily
interferences and assaults on one's bodily and mental integrity based upon
race, has the potential to be the straw that breaks the camel's back due to
the relentless nature of the racialized bombardment and the difficulty of
attributing racial animus, that hostility which is thought to indicate inten-
• 75
tion. Significantly, macro-aggression continues to exist in the form of
structural constraints and barriers to access and control oler essential re-
sources, resulting in continued residential segregation, disparate
educational access, and limited access to quality health care. 6
Racism has substantial pathogenic, psychological, and physical ef-
fects . Moreover, a strong relationship exists between mental health,
Aftermath, at http://www.hrw.org/campaigns/septemberl 1 /#hatewatch (last visited Oct. 23,
2003); Educators for Social Responsibility, List of Piblicly Reported US. Hate Crimes Against
Arabs, Muslims and other South Asians From September 11 Thorugh September 26, 2001, at
http://www.esrnational.org/discrimincidents20l109.htm (last visited Oct. 23,2003).
75. Katheryn K. Russell, The Racial Hoax as Crime: The Law as Affirmation, 71 IND.
L.J. 593 (1996). Russell states:
Microaggressions-individually directed, incessant, and cumulative assaults-
do not operate in a vacuum. In addition to one-on-one aggressions, Blacks
are confronted with assaults upon their group. Group assaults are termed
macro-aggressions. Macroaggressions are attacks, insults, and/or pejorative
statements made against Blacks byWhites. Unlike microaggressions, however,
they are neither directed at nor designed to offend a specific Black person.
Further, they are primarily characterized by the effect they have of rendering
Blacks invisible and portraying them in a stereotypically negative light. Fi-
nally, macroaggressions are played out through the press at the national level,
and as a result become part of our collective racial consciousness.
Id.
76. See HEALTH, RACE AND ETHNICITY (Thomas Rathwell & David Phillips eds.,
1986), for a comprehensive assessment of a multiplicity of health issues implicated by race
and racialization.
77. HANDBOOK OF RACIAL AND ETHNIC MINORITY PSYCHOLOGY, supra note 55, at
386. It is important to acknowledge, however, that there is substantial individual and group
variability in the experience of racism and discrimination, with the quantity and severity
of racism a person experiences depending to some degree on his or her phenotypic char-
acteristics (skin color, hair, other physical features) and social mannerisms (such as clothing,
speech, social skills). "Those who look, sound, or behave more "White" are more likely to
be accepted and less likely experience overt discriminatory experiences than those with
more ethnically distinct features, accents, and behaviors." Similarly, there is considerable
anecdotal and some empirical evidence of differences in reported risk of exposure to dis-
crimination, with poor male Blacks and Latinos, reporting more overt experiences with
discrimination than other ethnic groups ("driving while Black," assumptions that young
Black and Hispanic males are likely to be gang members, or sentencing differences as a
function of race). See also MaIjorie S. Zatz, Race, Ethnicity, and Determinate Sentencing, 22
CRIMINOLOGY 147 (1984) (discussing the subtle forms of racial disparities that still exist to
enhance or mitigate sentence lengths). But c. Malcolm D. Holmes et al.,Judges' Ethnicity
and Minority Sentencing: Evidence Concerning Hispanics, 74 Soc. Sci. Q. 496 (1993) (explain-
FALL 2003]
Michigan Journal of Race & Law
physical health, and well-being-the connection might be even more
pronounced for Blacks in America given the evidence of disparate physi-
cal health for minority populations. 8 Current evidence indicates that
while the general health for residents of the United States has improved
significantly in the past decade, this improvement has not been uniform.
Whites enjoy a significant health advantage over racial and ethnic minori-
ties in virtually all major health status indicators' 9 The notion of socially
induced stress as a precipitating factor in chronic disease is gaining accep-
tance. Many now recognize that stress can be one of the components of
any disease, not just of those designated "psychosomatic." Indeed, chronic
diseases are etiologically 0 linked to excessive stress and, in turn, this stress
is a product of specific socially structured situations inherent in the or-
ing that further research is necessary to determine whether minorities are discriminated
against in the judicial system).
78. See National Center on Minority Health and Health Disparities Website, available
at http://ncnihd.nih.gov/old/about-ncmhd/what.asp (last visited Dec. 4, 2003) (stating that
minorities bear a disproportionate burden of health problems); AHRQ Focus on Research:
Disparities in Health Care, http://ahrq.gov/news/focus/disparhc.htm (last visited Dec. 4,
2003) (citing higher cancer and diabetes rates among African Americans); Addressing Racial
and Ethnic Disparities in Health Care: Fact Sheet, http://ahrq.gov/research/disparit.htm (last
visited Dec. 4, 2003) (discussing the lack of a usual source of health care for African Ameri-
cans); see also National Center for Chronic Disease Prevention and Health Promotion, Racial
and Ethnic Approaches to Community Health (REACH 2010): Addressing Disparities in Health,
http://www.cdc.gov/nccdphp/aag/aag-reach.htm (last visited Dec. 4, 2003) [hereinafter
NCCDPHP] (stating that mortality rates until age 85 are higher for Blacks than for Whites);
Ellen Beck, Medicine Plus Health Information: Health Disparities Persists, http://www.nlm.nih.
gov/medlineplus/news/fullstory_14275.html (finding that disparities in morbidity are also
pronounced; the African American rate of diabetes is more than three times that of Whites;
heart disease is more than 40 percent higher than that ofWhites; prostate cancer is more than
double that of whites; HIV/AIDS is more than seven times that of Whites; deaths due to
HIV/AIDS have increased dramatically in the African American population in the past dec-
ade, and this disease is now one of the top five causes of death for this group; breast cancer is
higher than it is for Whites, even though African American women are more likely to receive
mammography screening than are White women);James S. Marks, Assistant Secretary for Legis-
lation: Testimony on Infant Mortality and Prenatal Care, http://www.hhs.gov/asl/testify/
t970313a.html (testifying that infant mortality is twice that ofWhites; the disparity in infant
mortality rates, which are considered sensitive indicators of a population's health status, is
particularly stark; it is not entirely accounted for by socioeconomic factors; although infant
mortality tends to decrease with maternal education, the most educated Black women have
infant mortality rates that exceed those of the least educated White women).
79. NCCDPHP supra note 78, at 25; see also David R.Williams & Chiquita Collins,
US Socioeconomic and Racial Differences in Health: Patterns and Explanations, 21 ANN. REV.
Soc. 349 (1995) (discussing the widening socioeconomic differential in health status and
an increasing racial gap in health between Blacks and Whites due to the worsening of
health status of the Black population).
80. Etiology is "a branch of knowledge concerned with causes; specifically: a branch
of medical science concerned with the causes and origins of diseases." Merriam-Webster
Dictionary Online, at http://www.m-w.com/cgi-bin/dictionary (last visited Dec. 4,
2003).
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ganization of modern societies."' Even susceptibility to microbial infec-
tious diseases is now considered a function of environmental conditions
that culminate in physiological stress on the individual, rather than simply• - 82
a function of exposure to an external source of infection.
Current epidemiologic evidence documents the persistent health
status differences in the U.S. population, in which Blacks, Native Ameri-
cans, Native Hawaiians, and Southeast Asians, in particular, carry a
disproportionate burden of morbidity and mortality. These facts create a
vicious cycle as poor health status leads to emotional upheaval, stress, and
other mental health sequelae; in turn, these disparate mental health impli-
cations lead to disparate physical health effects. 8 3 A review of literature on
the subject reveals that stress is a contributor to disease risk and impacts
the psychosocial resources of persons such as coping and social support.
Indeed such stress moderators partially account for ethnic health dispari-
ties:
[Alt the core of ethnic health disparities is differential exposure and
vulnerability to psychosocial stresses moderated by inadequate access to
and control over essential material, psychological, and social resources.
... [T]his disadvantageous stress-resource imbalance is created
by social status, defining attributes of race [and] ethnicity and
81. Williams et al., supra note 20, at 281 (exploring the "Racism-Stress Paradigm").
82. Williams & Collins, supra note 79, at 377-85.
83. Id. Different explanations have been offered to account for the excess burden of
disease on racial and ethnic minorities, both overall and for specific disorders. See e.g.,
Richard S. Cooper & James L. Borke, Intracelluluar Ions and Hypertension in Blacks, in
PATHOPHYSIOLOGY OF HYPERTENSION IN BLACKS 181 (John C.S. Fray & Jancie G. Douglas
eds., 1993) (suggesting differences in intracellular ion transfer mechanisms (salt metabo-
lism) as an explanation for differences in essential hypertension); Patrice G. Saab et al.,
Influence of Ethnicity and Gender on Cardiovascular Responses to Active Coping and Inhibitory-
Passive Coping Challenges, 59 J. AM. PSYCHOSOMATIC Soc'y 434 (1997) (suggesting differ-
ences in autonomic stress reactivity as an explanation for differences in essential
hypertension); Hector F. Myers & Faith H. McClure, Psychosocial Factors in Hypertension in
Blacks: The Case for an Interactive Perspective, in PATHOPHYSIOLOGY OF HYPERTENSION IN
BLAcKs, supra, at 90-106 (suggesting differences in psychosocial risk factors as an explana-
tion for differences in essential hypertension); Clifton Bogardus & Stephen Lillioja, Pima
Indians as a Model to Study the Genetics of NIDDM, 48 J. CELLULAR BIOCHEMISTRY 337, 337
n.4 (1992) (suggesting differences in genetic susceptibility as an explanation for differences
in diabetes rates); Sherman A. James, John Henryism and the Health of African Americans, 18
CULTURE MED. PSYCHOL. 163 (1994) (suggesting John Henryism as an explanation for
differences in health status and tendency to seek help); Thomas A. Arcury et al., Faith and
Health Self-Management of Rural Older Adults, 15 J. CROss-CuLTURAL GERONTOLOGY 55
(2000) (suggesting religiosity and spirituality as explanations for differences in health status
and tendency to seek help); Hector F Myers et al., Behavioral Risk Factors Related to Chronic
Disease in Ethnic Minorities, 14 HEALTH PSYCHOL. 613, 613 n.7 (1995) (suggesting differ-
ences in individual health behavior such as dietary intake, exercise, smoking, and drug use
as an explanation for differences in health status).
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social class that define the social hierarchy and life opportuni-
814ties [in America] .
Psychosocial behavioral risk factors are "nested within geographic,
developmental, [and] occupational social environments." The individual
characteristics cannot therefore adequately explain environmental effects
on health.8s Predictors of health and health differentials between groups
are shaped by race, ethnicity, and social class . Accordingly, contextualiza-
tion is as important an instrument of analysis in healthcare as it is in legal
analysis.
Macro-social factors such as poverty and social status influence
health through a variety of intermediary mechanisms, including individ-
ual health behaviors, access to and control of psychosocial resources, and
exposure to chronic life stresses.8 7 For instance, doctors caring for inner-
city patients have noted that such patients attend with a greater number
of "sociomas,, 88 the psychosocial bundle of burden disparately affecting
people of color. The evidence shows that Blacks are generally exposed to
more chronic and insidious stresses and report more distress, disease, and
dysfunction than Whites.89 This in turn feeds into general health care is-
sues on many levels. The circularity of physical and mental health is
highlighted by the Surgeon General's remarks that, "Americans do not
share equally in the best that science has to offer.... [D]isparities in men-
tal health services exist for racial and ethnic minorities, and thus, mental
illnesses exact a greater toll on their overall health and productivity."90
84. HANDBOOK OF RACIAL AND ETHNIC MINORITY PSYCHOLOGY, supra note 55, at
378.
85. Shelley. E. Taylor et al., Health Psychology: What is an Unhealthy Environment and
How Does it Get Under the Skin, 48 ANN. REV. PSYCHOL. 411,413 (1997).
86. See David R.Williams et al., The Concept of Race and Health Status in America, 109
PuB. HELTHI REP. 26, 28-34 (1994).
87. See Andrew Baum et al., Socioeconomic Status and Chronic Stress: Does Stress Ac-
count for SES Effects on Health, ANN.LS N.Y AcAD. Sci 131 (1999); Nancy Krieger et al.,
supra note 67; Myers et al., supra note 83; Williams et al., supra note 86.
88. According to Abraham:"Poor patients' ailments are made worse by delays in
getting care, and they show up at doctors' offices with more of what one physician called
'sociomas,' social problems that range from not having a ride to the doctor's office, to drug
addiction, to homelessness, to the despair that accompanies miserable life circumstances."
LAURIE KAYE ABRAHAM, MAMA MIGHT BE BETTER OFF DEAD 4 (1993).
89. Ethnic and racial minorities perceive discrimination as more stressful, although
White Americans will report discrimination, particularly claims of reverse discrimination
in employment. See Vetta L. Sanders Thompson, Racism: Perceptions of Distress Among African
Americans 38 COMMUNITY MENTAL HEALTH J. 111, 117 (2002); Krieger et al., supra note
67, at 1375-76;Williams, supra note 68.
90. Mental Health: Culture, Race, Ethnicity-Supplement, Message from Tommy G.
Thompson, Surgeon General's Report, http://www.mentalhealth.org/cre/message.asp (last
visited Oct. 13,2003).
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As part of his commitment to the elimination of inequality for
Americans with disabilities, President George W. Bush established the
President's New Freedom Commission on Mental Health in April 2002. 9'
The Commission was charged with identifying policies that could be im-
plemented by all levels of government to maximize the utility of existing
resources, improve coordination of treatment and services, and promote
successful community integration for all persons with serious mental ill-.92
ness or emotional disturbance.- The Commission began on the heals of
the first ever Surgeon General's report devoted entirely to mental illness.
According to the report,93 mental health is essential for personal
well-being, family relationships, and successful contributions to society.
While documenting the disabling nature of mental illness, the Surgeon
General's report also indicates that, as with access to physical health, there
are racially disparate statistics with respect to mental health. Specifically,
racial minorities have less access and availability to mental health care and
tend to receive poorer quality mental health services. 9 More relevant to
the analysis contained in this Article, the report indicates that factors such
as race, ethnicity, and culture affect all aspects of mental health and illness
but have particular impact upon the nature of the stressors confronted. A
growing number of researchers have emphasized that racism is a neglected
but central societal force that adversely affects the health of people of
color.
96
The cause of these adverse effects comes in two forms. First, the
quality and quantity of health-enhancing resources, including medical
care, are disparately distributed to members of marginalized communi-
• 97
ties. Second, racism shapes the creation and operation of societal
institutions, socio-economic opportunities, mobility and access, life op-
portunities, and the general well-being of racialized groups and
individuals.
91. See President's New Freedom Commission on Mental Health Official Website
(2002), at http://www.mentalhealthcommnission.gov (last visited Oct. 13, 2003).
92. Id.
93. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., MENTAL HEALTH: A REPORT OF THE SUR-
GEON GENERAL (1999).
94. Id. at 180.
95. Id. at 182.
96. See HANDBOOK OF RACIAL AND ETHNIC MINORITY PSYCHOLOGY, supra note 55.
Moreover, the disparate health care reality is a civil rights issue. See Sidney Watson, Reform-
ing Civil Rights With Systems Reform: Health Care Disparities, Translation Services and Safe
Harbors, 9 RACE & ETHNIC ANC. L. J. 13 (forthcoming 2003) (noting racial disparities in
medical care are a civil rights issue and also a quality of care problem).
97. HANDBOOK OF RACIAL AND ETHNIC MINORITY PSYCHOLOGY, supra note 55, at 1-
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B. Coping
Coping is a term used to describe the manner in which individuals
respond to stressors.9 s The methods of coping most commonly employed
by Blacks further illustrate the connection between racial abuse and the
mental and physical sequelae that result from such abuse, and suggest a
heightened reaction to specific racial abuses.99
Models of stress and disease often distinguish among stress exposure,
which involves confrontation with an environmental stressor, stress ap-
praisal, which involves estimating the relative threat of the stressor, and
weighing demands against available resources and stress response, which
involves emotional, physiological, and behavioral responses to the ap-
praised stressor. '°° There is, of course, enormous variation in how an
individual responds to racial abuse. Four stress coping styles employed by
Black individuals have been identified by Myers:
• the overt expression of anger or fear;
" suppression and inward direction of anger;
• artificial methods of reducing tension (e.g., narcotics
and alcohol); and
• self-directed stress-management style based upon the
demands of the situations.'0 '
Researchers believe that the fourth option is the most productive
and valuable. 0 2 However, this is not an option for everyone.'0 3 Inevitably,
98. See Richard S. Lazarus, Coping Theory and Research: Past, Present, and Future, 55
PSYCHOSOMATIC MED. 234 (1993). Coping is defined as the strategies engaged in to man-
age demands that are perceived as taxing or exceeding one's available resources. See
RICHARD S. L~zAuus & SusAN FOLKMAN, STRESS, APPRAISAL AND COPING 141 (1984).
99. Id.
100. Lobel et al., Prenatal Maternal Stress and Prematurity: A Prospective Study of Socio-
economically Disadvantaged Women, 11 HEALTH PSYCHOL. 32 (1992).
101. Myers, supra note 26, at 148.
102. See Linda James Myers et al., Physiological Responses to Anxiety and Stress: Reactions
to Oppression, Galvanic Skin Potential, and Heart Rate, 20J. BLACK STUD. 80 (1989).
103. A critical factor in evaluating the impact of stressful events is the individual's
perception of them. Such perception depends on personal characteristics determining the
appraisal of the significance of potentially harmfuil, challenging, or threatening events. It is
this cognitive process which differentiates a stressor from a stimulus and which determines
the nature of the stress reaction and subsequent coping activities. Barbara Snell Dohren-
wend & Bruce P Dohrenwend, Overview and Prospects for Research on Stressful Life Events, in
STRESSFUL LIFE EvENTs: THEIR NATURE AND EFFECTS 317 (Barbara Snell Dohrenwend &
Bruce P Dohrenwend eds., 1973).
The perception of stressful events is mediated by two broad categories of variables,
one consisting of personal or "internal" factors and the other of interpersonal or external
ones. Personal factors include: biological and psychological threshold sensitivities, intelli-
gence, verbal skills, morale, personality type, psychological defenses, past experience, and a
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there are victims of racial abuse incapable of such self-reflection, or with-
out the coping mechanisms for relieving stress. Arguably, these are the
individuals most likely to come into contact with the criminal law and for
whom an infusion of critical psychology into criminal mitigatory defenses
is the most relevant.
As mentioned above, in addition to the mental sequelae of racism,
there are also corollary physiological responses. In assessing the cumulative
burden of racism, it is reasonable to expect greater psychological and
physiological impacts, and consequently greater allostatic load, in those
that report repeated exposure to both objectively measurable stressors as
well as subjectively experienced stress and distress due to exposure to ra-
cism. 104 Therefore, "stress response:' as explored in the critical psychology,
is an essential point of analysis for provocative conduct and the reaction
thereto, the disturbance assessed in extreme emotional disturbance, and
the mental impairment determination in diminished capacity. Specifically,
if the stress response relates to a micro- or macro- aggression, this infor-
mation may be worthy of evidentiary consideration in the criminal
defense analysis.
Of course, it is also likely that racialized individuals and groups will
differ in the degree to which they have developed "racial" filters, cognitive
sense of mastery over one's fate. Demographic characteristics such as age, education, in-
come and occupation may also contribute to the individual's evaluation of stressful
conditions and his response to them. Id.
Another broad set of contingencies, or mediating variables, in the stress equation
which may be considered social or transactional in nature consists of the buffers and sup-
porters accessible to the individual in his social environment. The social positions
individuals or groups occupy in a community can materially influence their experience of
stress and presumably, therefore, their vulnerability to a broad range of chronic diseases.
While the effects of exposure to stressful events may be reduced for those who are effec-
tively embedded in social networks or support systems, they are commonly exacerbated by
deficiencies or impairments of such systems. Lawrence E. Hinkle, Jr., The Effect of Exposure
to Culture Change, Social Change, and Changes in Interpersonal Relationships on Health, in
STRESSFUL LIFE EvENTs, supra. Three such categories--social isolation, social marginally
(Black membership) and status inconsistency-may be considered in this context.
Similarly, persons with more skills, assets, and resources and with more versatile de-
fenses and broader experience tend to fare better when confronted with abuses or
stressors. In general, the more competence individuals have demonstrated in the past, the
more likely it is that they will cope adaptively with a current stressor. The more experi-
ence they have had previously with a particular stressor, the more probable that their
present responses will be effective. Jeremone K. Myers et al., Social Class, Life Events, and
Psychiatric Symptoms:A Longitudinal Study, in STRESSFUL LIFE EVENTs, supra.
104. See Cheryl A. Armstead et al., Relationship of Racial Stressors to Blood Pressure Re-
sponses and Anger Expression in Black Collect Students, 8 HEALTH PSYCHOL. 541 (1989); see
also CaroylnY Fang & Hector E Myers, The Effects of Racial Stressors and Hostility on Cardio-
vascular Reactivity in African American and Caucasian Men, 20 HEALTH PSYCHOL. 64 (2001);
Nancy Krieger & Stephen Sidney, Racial Discrimination and Blood Pressure: The Cardiac Study
of Young Black and White Adults, 86 AM.J. PUB. HEALi 1370 (1996); HANDBOOK OF RACIAL
AND ETHNIC MINOITv PSYCHOLOGY, supra note 55, at 179-234.
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schemas, or scripts that mediate how they interpret and respond to "ra-
cially meaningful experiences" experiences."'° American history and
contemporary racial problems may explain why some individuals or
groups have more sensitive racial filters that predispose them to interpret a
wider range of experiences and events as "racially meaningful." Such a
racial default position should come as no surprise-American history has
taught Blacks and other people of color to be wary ofWhites and has lead
to heightened scrutiny of suspect behavior or speech. Interracial commu-
nications are burdened by subtext; little is taken at face value in such
interactions and reactions are often devoid of filtration. Admittedly, re-
sponses need not be violent. There are substantially different individual
responses to stressors. These individual responses are conditioned by fac-
tors related to the constitutional make-up of an individual, coping'0 6 skills,
and resources such as financial, religious and familial access for counseling
and support. Additionally, psychological behavioral factors are likely to
mediate or moderate distress effects on well-being.
10 7
According to Banyard and Graham-Bermaun, "coping occurs in a
context shaped by social forces based on gender, race, class, age and sexual
orientation. These forces exert a powerful influence both on how a stress-
105. Furthermore, racialized persons may also differ in the extent and salience of
racial filters and scripts that influence their relative "sensitivity" to stressful racial cues and
degree of reactivity to racially meaningful events. These individual and group differences
in appraisal also apply to life stresses generally. Some racialized people may minimize or
downplay the significance of stressful events and experiences. This may be interpreted as a
response bias (such as denial, minimization) and a form of defensive reappraisal and coping.
However, it may also be the result of habituation to a chronic stressor to which one has
become familiar and for which one has developed a way of coping that reduces the impact
of the stressor (such as less distress in the face of limited financial resources). It is notewor-
thy that even though psychological accommodation can be protective against distress,
exposure to the stressors still has physiologic effects and costs, and it is the latter that might
contribute over time to the cumulative vulnerability that results in adverse health out-
comes and responsive behavior. See HANDBOOK OF RACIAL AND ETHNIC MINORITY
PSYCHOLOGY, supra note 55, at 389.
106. The impact that exposure to chronic stresses has on health is also moderated by
how one copes with these experiences. The relative effectiveness of coping effort is deter-
mined by the type of coping (such as active vs. passive), the type of stressor (such as
controllable vs. uncontrollable), match between type of stressor and the coping response
used, and the availability of adequate resources for coping (such as adequate knowledge or
access to treatment). See supra note 98.
107. The vulnerability of a person to such racialized stressors is dependent upon
appraisal and coping styles (such as cognitive schemas or proactive vs. avoidant coping),
social supports, psychological dispositions (such as perceived persona and collective con-
trol; dispositional optimism/pessimism), and sociocultural factors (such as acculturation
and acculturative stress, and religiosity that can either exacerbate or moderate stress vul-
nerability). See Richard J. Contrada et al., Ethnicity-Related Sources of Stress and their Effects
on Well-Being, 9 Cuusa,'cr DIRECTIONS IN PSYCHOL. SCI. 136 (2000); Krieger & Sidney, supra
note 104.
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ful situation is appraised and on judgments made about what coping re-
sources are available.'" '0 s An individual's social position can constrain
resources and choice of coping strategies. Therefore, those with more re-
sources typically cope "better."0 9 Members of marginalized groups may
face special challenges to active, as opposed to passive, coping. Factors such
as limitations on finances, information, and access to requisite technical ex-
pertise or other resources, as well as cultural, social, or psychological
barriers, may discourage active coping."0
As such, Blacks confronted with interactions that are hostile or oth-
erwise uncomfortable likely adopt a default position, described by critical
psychologists as "Constant Threat Awareness,""' which ascribes racial
animus to those interactions. Unlike most Whites, many Blacks are aware
of their racialized status." 2 Blacks are often either consciously or uncon-
sciously on their guard, gauging how they are perceived and treated by
Whites and by other ethnic or racial groups. Many Blacks engage in what
is colloquially known as "picking your battles.' '1 3 Such a state of height-
ened vigilance, hyper-reactivity, and preemptive coping is psychologically
taxing, tiring, and is likely to increase the risk of psychological distress and
other disorders." 4 In addition to being burdensome, such constant "sizing
108. Victoria L. Banyard & Sandra A. Graham-Bermann, Can Wonen Cope?:A Gender
Analysis of Theories of Coping with Stress, 17 PSYCHOL.WOMEN Q. 303,311 (1993).
109. SeeTaylor et al., supra note 85, at 411.
110. For example, assertiveness in Black men and women is often misperceived as
aggressiveness or arrogance and responded to with fear or punishment. On the other hand,
passive compliance (such as going along to get along), although useful in deflecting threats,
does not usually yield desired goals (such as earned rewards) and has been shown to confer
greater health risks. See Krieger & Sidney, supra note 104. Lower-class members experi-
ence more severe though not more frequent stressful events than do middle-class
members. Within social class, stressful situations are both more frequent and more severe
for Blacks than for Whites. Dohrenwend & Dohrenwend, supra note 103.
111. Another preferred coping strategy is not to shrink from problems, but to con-
front them. See, e.g., C.L. Broman, Coping with personal Problems, in MENTAL HEALTH IN
BLACK AMERICA 117-29 (Harold W Neighbors & James S. Jackson eds., 1996); HANDBOOK
OF RACIAL AND ETHNIC MINORITY PSYCHOLOGY, supra note 55, at 388.
112. See BARBARA J. FLAGG, WAS BLIND BUT Now I SEE: WHITE RACE CONSCIOUSNESS
AND THE LAW 969 (1998) (stating that the most interesting thing about White self percep-
tion is the fact that in most instances they have no racial self-awareness).
113. The impact that exposure to chronic stress has on health is moderated by how
one interprets or appraises and responds to the stress experience. Stress appraisal involves
the weighing of one's resources against the demands of the stressor to determine how large
a threat the stressor is to well-being. Resources encompass personality factors such as self-
esteem and self-efficacy, as well as demographic and social factors, such as monetary re-
sources and social support. For Blacks, stress appraisal involves not only the subjective
examination of resources versus demands but also the filtering of stressful experiences
through one's unique cultural lens. See HANDBOOK OF RACIAL AND ETHNIC MINORITY
PSYCHOLOGY, supra note 55, at 389.
114. See id. at 388.This hypothesis receives partial support in studies of Black-White
differences in twenty-four hour ambulatory blood pressure, which suggest that the
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up," by which the possibilities for racial conflict are estimated, may lead to
misinterpretations or overreactions due to allostatic load. This in turn in-
creases the impact such events may have on health and well-being.
Criminal law implications stem from the reasonableness assessment.'I s In-
deed, the (over)reaction which might result from a racialized encounter
under a scenario of prolonged or heightened threat awareness is the cata-
lyst of the criminal law defense theory. For instance, had the Walker family
in Bohanon responded to the threatening letters with violence, such ac-
tions might have provided the prototypical case to examine the relevance
of critical psychology-the Walker's allostatic loads, threat awareness, and
level of (hyper)vigilance would be material for the determination of
criminal culpability.
C. The Humiliation Dynamic
Humiliation is an understandable consequence of racism, especially
blatant and explicit racial abuse. Three players must exist in order to create
a dynamic of humiliation: perpetrator, victim, and witness."' If these three
roles exist in the presence of ridicule, scorn, contempt, or other degrading
treatment, the humiliation dynamic is likely to occur."7
The humiliation dynamic can cause psychic trauma because re-
peated subjection to humiliation breeds common contempt, which may
be inwardly or outwardly directed. As is the case with stress, individual
reactions to humiliation are variable and dependent on a number of fac-
tors. The most common consequential responses are:
• the creation of a person who is very passive;
• the creation of a person who is enraged;" 8 and
• frustration from the humiliation of racism which can be
turned inward resulting in self-abusive behaviors, such as
alcoholism or drug-abuse, or in violent acts towards fel-
low people of color."9
significantly higher mean blood pressures among Blacks may be the result of maintaining
an unconscious state of heightened physical arousal even during sleep. See Williams et al.,
supra note 20. Among African Americans, in particular, symptoms of depression are associ-
ated with increased risk of hypertension. Thomas Pickering, Depression, Race, Hypertension,
and the Heart, 2 J. CLINICAL HYPERTENSION 410-12 (2000).
115. See discussion infra Part Il1.
116. See Jean T. Griffin, Racism and Humiliation in the African Community, 149 J. Pm-
MARY PREVENTION 150 (1991).
117. Id.
118. Note that these two responses are not mutually exclusive, as one can be both
passive and enraged.
119. Id. at 152.
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No matter the manner of coping, "in any consideration of the hu-
miliation dynamic and racism, it should be noted that among the most
potent consequences of humiliation are that it engenders rage and causes
damage to victims' sense of self and identity."""
It is indisputable that the humiliation dynamic has been employed
against African Americans for quite some time. Social control through the
use of humiliation pervaded the institution of slavery as Blacks were sold
in public auctions, publicly whipped and disciplined, and invasive inspec-
tions of their bodies and the bodies of their loved ones were routinely
carried out, often in public.' Indeed as Fede has noted,"[a] fixed princi-
ple of slave law granted masters the unlimited right to abuse their slaves to
any extreme of brutality and wantonness as long as the slave survived.
[Laws that] appeared to protect slaves from violent [W]hite abuse [in fact
served a] legitimating purpose.' 22 In the context of the plantation, all
three players necessary for the existence of the humiliation dynamic were
present.
The plantation was the place most masters and slaves struggled
to define their relationship ... Punishment was central to that
relationship. There was a coherent purpose in punishment: it
was one procedure used to "degrade and undermine" the hu-
manity of the slave and "so distinguish him from human beings
who are not property." At the same time, there were limits on
the amount or type of violence that society would accept....
But as Daniel Flanigan notes: 'it was in the protection of
[B]lacks from crime rather than the treatment of [B]lack of-
fenders that the criminal law of slavery failed most
miserably.'. .. To limit the power of slaveowners was always dif-
ficult, and it was not at all irrational to treat the violence they
used against their slaves as if it were outside the legal order, as a
noncrime.Vicious such a policy choice would be, but it would
be logical .... The laws actually 'decriminalized' violence to the
extent that it was thought a 'necessary' or 'ordinary' incident of
slavery."' 
2 3
120. Id. at 150.
121. Bennett notes that it was common for naked slaves to be crowded into stalls.
Men, women, and children would be inspected to assess their value. After being sold, en-
slaved Africans were routinely branded with hot irons in order to facilitate identification.
Given the fact that these humiliations were often witnessed by crowds of people, all three
roles necessary for operation of the humiliation dynamic were present. See generally LERONE
BENNETT, JR., BEFORE THE MAYFLOWER: A HISTORY OF THE NEGRO IN AMERICA (rev. ed.
1964).
122. THOMAS D. MORRIS, SOUTHERN SLAVERY AND THE LAW, 1619-1860 182-183
(1996).
123. Id.
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Whites were actually not discouraged from abusing and humiliating Afri-
can slaves. Indeed such behavior had moral, physical, and legal sanction.1
The cultural imagery of humiliation is a permanent fixture in the
lives of many Blacks. In this vein, the role of the media as a creator and
purveyor of culture in the contemporary humiliation of Blacks deserves
further analysis. The news media, as well as television programs like
COPS, inscribes humiliating images on the psyche of many Blacks. As
Griffin has explained:
One of the destructive results of the legacy of slavery is that
African Americans experience themselves as society's under-
dogs. They undergo a legacy of repeated public humiliations,
symbolized for them by the typical nightly local newscast in
those parts of the country where it has become routine to have
TV coverage of African American males being led to jail in
124. Slaves were deprived of two fundamental means of legal defense: the right to
testify against White persons and judgment by a body of their peers. See R.OBERT SHAw, A
LEGAL HISTORY OF SLAVERY IN THE UNITED STATES 174-75 (1978). Penalties inflicted upon
slaves for given offenses were routinely more severe than those assigned to White persons
for the same crimes. Id. Further, the conduct of the slave and, to a lesser degree, of free
Blacks was also controlled by an additional body of vexatious petty enactments or munici-
pal regulations that did not apply at all to the White community. Id. The slave was exempt
from a few laws, usually of a family or moral nature, that applied to White persons. Id. He
could not be prosecuted for bigamy or adultery, such crimes implying the recognition of
legal marriage, which was denied to slaves. Id. Even the rape of one slave by another slave
was not a crime at all, or was considered so minor an offense as seldom to give rise to
prosecution. Id.
But this slight exemption was offiet by a wide range of infractions that applied
solely to slaves such as: gathering of more than seven male slaves at any place, without a
White man among them; traveling beyond the limits of a town, or of a plantation, where a
slave lived, without being accompanied by a White person or without a pass; being out
upon the streets of a town or city, without a pass, after nine o'clock at night; frequenting
grog shops; being found drinking or gaming; giving or selling alcoholic drinks to slaves (an
offense on the part ofWhite persons); hiring themselves out; renting or occupying, on his
or their own account, any room, house or store; keeping, or carrying, a firearm; riding
horseback, without the permission of his owner; keeping, or hunting with, a dog, even on
his master's property; keeping or trading in any article for sale, without specific written
permission from his master; keeping horses, cattle or swine as his own property (possession
of chickens usually allowed, or even encouraged). Id.
Sources of racial humiliation need not rise to the level of cross-burning nor public
tarring and feathering. Indeed, the systemic and systematic experiences of racism are often
equally disconcerting when dealing with a faceless perpetrator--such as an institution,
enterprise, university, or corporate entity. These perpetrators are frustrating precisely be-
cause of the difficulty in piercing the organizational structure to determine culpability. See
Lenese C. Herbert, A Cinema Racial Rating System (unpublished manuscript, on file with
author) (describing the damaging effects of the "racial sucker punch" when Blacks are
blindsided by the callous and disparaging depictions of Black people in movies which do
not feature a racial story line).
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handcuffs for some real or alleged crime. Night after night Af-
rican Americans sit before their TVs seeing members of their
community arrested on charges that are often dropped or that
result in verdicts of not guilty, exonerating outcomes that are
rarely acknowledged, let alone featured, by the media. The
criminal justice system and the news media play very active
parts in the everyday humiliations with the accompanying
pain, anguish, and sense of oppression experienced repeatedly
by members of the African American community as they
watch such biased newscasts."2
Media propaganda against Blacks in America has a long history and
can be traced at least to the movie "Birth of a Nation.' ' 26 Other, perhaps
more onerous and certainly more obvious instances of humiliation in-
clude driving, walking, and standing while Black and Brown.1 27 Over the
last few years there have been public admissions of what most people of
color, especially Black and Brown Americans, have known for years-that
racial profiling is a prevalent practice amongst police, security guards, and
customs and immigrations officials.'
28
These encounters are humiliating in the least and enraging at most.
To be strip-searched, frisked, and wrongly accused of a crime is a terrify-
ing experience that can generate a plethora of debilitating reactions and
emotions. For example, the trauma, both mental and physical, inflicted
upon the young Black woman who was publicly strip-searched by metro-
politan police in Toronto reveals the depth of this injury.'29 Any public
search is degrading and dehumanizing mistreatment calculated to humili-
ate. The mental and physiological sequelae of a public strip search are
almost unimaginable. The effects of such humiliation may render the vic-
tim mentally disordered and increasingly vulnerable to racial and other
forms of abuse.
125. Griffin, supra note 116, at 153; see also THE MEDIA IN BLACK AND WHITE
(Everette E. Dennis & Edward C. Pease eds., 1997); ROBERT M. ENTMARD & ANDREW Ro-
JECKI, THE BLACK IMAGE IN THE WHITE MIND: MEDIA AND RACE IN AMERICA (2000).
126. See generally VINCENT F RoCCHI-o, REEL RACISM: CONFRONTING HOLLYWOOD'S
CONSTRUCTION OF AFRO-AMERICAN CULTuRE 29 (2000).
127. See generally DAVID A. HARRIS, PROFILES IN INJUSTICE: WHY RACIAL PROFILING
CANNOT WORK 129-39 (2002) (describing how racial profiling affects Latinos, Asians, and
Arabs);Victor C. Romero, Racial Profiling: "Driving lhile Mexican" and Affirmative Action, 6
MICH. J. RACE & L. 195 (2000); Victor C. Romero, Critical Race Theory in 3 Acts: Racial
Profiling, Affirmative Action, and Diversity Visa Lottery, 66 ALB. L. REV. 375 (2003).
128. See HARRIS, supra note 127, at 16-48, 129-44; Racial Profiling Data Collection,
at http://www.racialprofilinganalysis.neu.edu (last visited Oct. 23, 2003).
129. Audry Smith was on vacation in Canada in 1996 when police wrongly accused
her of drug trafficking and publicly strip-searched her in a Toronto parking lot. Following
the incident, a film crew returned to Jamaica with Smith to discover the impact the ex-
perience has had on her and her family members. See AUDRY SMITH: THE FIGHT FOR
JUSTICE; see also Griffin, supra note 116, at 159.
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Black communities and the individuals in them are repeatedly in-
jured by humiliation-injury that begins early in life for Black children."30
The humiliation of Black children is often present in the institutions in
which they must participate, such as the educational system. The body of
literature on racial disparities in education is substantial. The literature not
only deals with the recent increase in educational segregation and the
conditional accreditation of some inner city public schools, but also with
the negligent and sometimes oppressive conditions under which Black
and Brown children are expected (or not expected) to learn.1
3
1
One of the more common examples of such educational humilia-
tion is the streaming of Black children, especially boys, into special
education classes. 132 Beyond the lowering of personal self-esteem, there is
a lowering of esteem associated with one's collective identity, a negative
image projected onto entire Black communities.' 33 Even for academically
successful Black students, it is not uncommon to be taunted by fellow
Black students about their academic success. Students are chided about
"trying to be White," their proper English and grammar denounced as
"talking White." It therefore seems that in the academic setting, some
Blacks believe that Black academic attainment is an oxymoron or is a
badge of inauthenticity or of cooptation into White culture.1
34
130. Griffin, supra note 116, at 159.
131. The Civil Rights Project: Harvard University, Research on Race & Ethnicity,
http://www.civilrightsproject.harvard.edu/research/race.php (last visited Dec. 4, 2003)
(describing research aimed to address civil rights issues affecting Latino and Asian commu-
nities); National Association of Elementary School Principals Official Website,
http://www.naesp.org (last visited Dec. 4, 2003) (advocating for educators to take respon-
sibility for improving the education of poor and minority students).
132. According to Fine: "Black students are three times more likely than White stu-
dents to be labeled 'mentally retarded."' Lisa Fine, Disparate Measures, EDUC. WEEK ON WEB,
http://wxvw.edweek.org/ew/newstory.cfin?slug=41charlotte.h21 (last visited Oct. 23,
2003).
133. Griffin, supra note 116, at 159. Griffin notes:
[S]uch lack of group-esteem is enacted frequently whenever members of the
African American community do not trust or accept fellow African Ameri-
can physicians, lawyers, teachers, social workers, or tradespeople. The phrase
heard often is, "Get me a WHITE ... doctor, lawyer, dentist, teacher,
plumber, dressmaker, etc." The message that has become internalized is, "If
the person is like me, or a member of my racial group, he/she cannot be any
good, since I and my whole group are no good."
Id. While the comments expressed in the quote above are certainly not uncommon, per-
haps some of the desire expressed to retain a White person stems not so much from self-
loathing or community loathing, but from the pragmatic reality that White people are able
to "get the job done" with greater ease and efficiency due to the many barriers, including
systemic and structural impediments, that confront people of color.
134. See Bob Herbert, Breaking Away, N. Y TIMES, July 10, 2003, at A23. Herbert
writes:
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While self-hatred, to the extent that it can be assessed is rare, nega-
tive group attitudes and orientations are quite common. Each of these is
an acculturation and assimilation strategy for coping with a racialized
world. Discrimination affects attitudes and behaviors towards these coping
strategies and, to the extent that individuals understand racism and its in-
sidious nature, they tend to defend self-esteem and image.' z5 The violence
is not self-denigration, as much as it is misdirected anger vented on less
well defended targets than the racist society inflicting the abuse.'3 6 This is
precisely the self-loathing and self-denigration that has its roots in past
and present racial abuses. The result, for some, is the culturally manufac-
tured self-fulfilling prophecy of violence in Black communities'37 and
community norms calling for "keeping it real" or authenticity through
gang or street culture, as opposed to through the alleged "majority" indi-
cia of success.
The anger and rage experienced during these humiliating encoun-
ters that is not sublimated via social activism or other constructive
behavior is typically discharged in one of two ways, either inwardly in the
form of self-destructive behaviors, or outwardly in the form of other-
directed destruction. 13 Even where an individual directs their destructive
Ms. Jhingory is a 22-year-old [B]lack woman from Washington, D.C., who
went off to college a few years ago. "One of the connections I had with my
friends back home was that we had always been sort of aspiring hip-hop art-
ists and things like that," she said. "But we were young, you know, and I
eventually woke up from la-la land and realized that I would have to get an
education and a job, something a little more concrete than fantasies about
the hip-hop underground." She noticed that when she came home on visits
from school, some of her friends treated her differently. "I don't know if it
was out ofjealousy or resentment or whatever," she said, "but they would ac-
tually say to me, 'You're acting [W]hite now.'They'd say that.They'd say, 'You
act [W]hite.' Or,'You act proper.
Id.
135. E-mail from Dr. Vetta Thompson, Psychologist, University of Missouri, to
Camille A. Nelson, Assistant Professor, St. Louis University School of Law (Aug. 7, 2003)
(on file with author).
136. Id.
137. For some, the rhetoric in Black communities of "keeping it real" means educa-
tional under-attainment, urban warfare, hyper-sexuality, and celebrated criminality. There is
much commentary on this philosophy as an externally manufactured, yet accepted imph-
cation of hip-hop culture. See Bob Baker, Notorious PhD, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 10, 2003, at D1.
138. Griffin, supra note 116, at 160. See BELL HOOKS, KILLING RAGE: ENDING RACISM
163 (1995) (discussing Black on Black violence as abuse and frustration that cannot be
directed against White America without serious consequences). For information about
self-destructive behaviors in Black communities, see Alton R. Kirk, Destructive Behaviors
Among Members of the Black Community with a Special Focus on Males: Causes and Methods of
Intervention, 14 J. MULTICULTURAL COUNSELING & DEV. 3 (1986), which contends that stress
is significantly related to the degree and amount of power perceived by an individual
within the societal context and that, consequently, Blacks experience a great deal of stress.
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behavior inwards, they are rendered more vulnerable to forms of abuse,
creating a spiral of enhanced vulnerability. Racial abuse, whether explicit
isolated incidents, ongoing cumulative humiliations, or structural impedi-
ments, wears down even the most resilient victims. 139 What therefore, of
the more vulnerable members of the Black community who may lack the
coping skills of the Walkers in Bohanon and are without substantial coping
resources?
For these individuals, responsive violence may result in prolonged
interaction with the criminal justice system. Considering the stigma and
loss of liberty resultant from a finding of criminal culpability for murder,
relevant information pertaining to the circumstances of the killing and the
mental vulnerabilities of the racially abused accused should be considered.
Accordingly, critical psychology should be introduced as a consideration
for mitigated sentencing where passion exceeds reason.
II. CRIMINAL LAW DEFENSES CAPABLE OF
CRITICAL PSYCHOLOGY INFUSION
"Those who compose the fringe of society have always been the accept-
able scapegoats, the butt ofjokes, and the favored whipping boys. It
resembles the pattern within psychotic families where one child is set
up as "sick" and absorbs the whole family's destructiveness. The child
may indeed be sick in unsociably visible and dramatically destructive
ways, but the family is unhealthy in its conspiracy not to see in them-
selves the emanation of such sickness. The child becomes the public
mirror of quietly enacted personality slaughter. ""'4
Traditionally, in order to be considered a homicide under the law, a
killing must have been committed with a degree of premeditated coolness
and deliberation under circumstances in which "ordinary men" would not
have their reason obscured by passion. 141 Such a homicide, typical of what
is considered a first-degree offense, must have sprung from a wicked, de-
praved, or malignant mind worthy of the attachment of criminal
culpability.42 Accordingly, a homicide committed in the absence of these
criteria is deemed worthy of mitigation.
According to the Model Penal Code ("MPC"), "At common law,
murder was defined as the unlawful killing of another human being with
139. See generally COSE, supra note 24.
140. PATRICIA J. WILLIAMS, THE ALCHEMY OF RACE AND RIGHTS: DIARY OF A LAW
PROFESSOR 167 (1991).
141. Maher v. People, 10 Mich. 212, 218 (1862).
142. Id.
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'malice aforethought."' 1 4 3 The difference between murder and manslaugh-
ter was generally understood to be the presence or absence of malice.' 4
Malice was a complicated concept under the common law that generally
included four states of mind:
" the intent to kill or an awareness that death would result,
unless it was caused by the heat of passion;
" the intent to cause grievous bodily injury;
" extreme recklessness variously described as circumstances
evincing "a depraved mind" an "abandoned or malignant
heart" or a "wanton and wilful disregard of an unreason-
able human risk"; or
" the intent to commit a felony, known as the "felony-
murder" rule.
145
Therefore, all unlawful homicides committed without malice afore-
thought were considered either voluntary or involuntary manslaughter.'
46
Involuntary manslaughter consisted of unintentional homicide due to
ordinary recklessness arising in the conmmission of minor crimes'47 while
voluntary manslaughter, the precursor to extreme mental or emotional
disturbance, has been defined as "an intentional homicide, done in a sud-
den heat of passion, caused by adequate provocation, before there has
been a reasonable opportunity for the passion to cool."' 48 Passion has typi-
cally been defined as rage, but also includes fear or any violent and intense
emotion sufficient to dethrone reason. 149 The essence of voluntary man-
slaughter is the killing of the "provocateur," without malice aforethought,
under the sudden impulse of passions ignited by the provocation. The
provocation defense, as originally conceived, was a concession to human
frailty, and perhaps non-deterability, where the provocative act was of such
a nature that it disturbed the judgment and mental faculties of the
"reasonable man.""' The provocative act thus weakened the killer's
143. MODEL PENAL CODE 5 210.2 cmt. 1 (Official Draft and Revised Comments
1980).
144. See, e.g., State v. Faulkner, 483 A.2d 759, 761 (Md. 1984); State v.Ward, 396 A.2d
1041, 1045 (Md. 1978); Davis v. State, 39 Md. 355,362 (1874).
145. MODEL PENAL CODE, supra note 143 (citations omitted).
146. Id. § 210.3 cmts. 1 & 2.
147. Id. § 210.3 cmt. 2.
148. Cox v. State, 534 A.2d 1333 (Md. 1988); see MODEL PENAL CODE, supra note
143, 5 210.3; see also Faulkner, 483 A.2d at 761-62; Ward, 396 A.2d at 1049-50;Whitehead
v. State, 262 A.2d 316,319 (Md. Ct. Spec.App. 1970).
149. MODEL PENAL CODE, supra note 143, 5 210.3 cmt. 5(a); see also People v.
Borchers, 325 P.2d 97,102 (Cal. 1958); People v. Danielly, 202 P2d 18, 27 (Cal. 1949), cert.
denied, 337 U.S. 919 (1949); State v. Smart, 328 S.W2d 569, 574 (Mo. 1959).
150. See Jeremy Blumenthal, The Reasonable Woman Standard: A Meta-Analytic Review
of Gender Differences in Perceptions of Sexual Harassment, 22 LAW & HuMAN BEHAV. 33, 33--
34, 37 (1998); see also Eflison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872, 878-79 (9th Cir. 1991).
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self-control to the point where he was not sufficiently culpable for mur-
der, but only for manslaughter.
This concession to human frailty is important and implicates the ra-
tionale for consideration of critical psychology as elucidating the psyche
of a racially abused offender. The psychology along with the considered
affirmative defenses suggests that one who kills while provoked might
demonstrate a significantly different character deficiency than one who
kills absent such passion. I"
The doctrines addressed in this part spring from the evolution of the
traditionally defined definition of murder. They are overlapping defenses
that take account of the absence of some of the above-mentioned hall-
marks of homicide in the first degree-the lack of premeditation,
deliberation, and malice. Provocation, extreme emotional and mental dis-
turbance, and diminished capacity share a common genesis, but have
evolved to take on separate and unique forms. This part will explore the
common history, highlight similarities, and focus on distinctions in these
doctrines, especially as they allow for infusion with critical psychology.
A. Provocation
An intentional killing committed in response to provocation consti-
tutes manslaughter, rather than murder. In most jurisdictions, the
defendant must prove the following to establish provocation:
that the murder was committed under the influence of
the heat of passion, produced by adequate or reasonable
provocation;
before a reasonable time had elapsed for the blood to
cool and reason to resume; and
the killing was the result of the temporary excitement, by
which self-control was disturbed, rather than of any
wickedness of heart or cruelty or recklessness of disposi-
tion.
If these tests are met, the law mitigates the killing to man-
slaughter. 15
1
151. MODEL PENAL CODE, supra note 143, § 210.3 cmt. 5(a).
152. Maher v. People, 10 Mich. 212, 218 (1862). Stated another way, the test is
viewed as follows:
1. There must have been adequate provocation, usually in the form of a
wrongful act or insult;
2. Which would have been sufficient to deprive the reasonable person of
self-control;
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Provocation, therefore, is a rule of mitigation for intentional homi-
cides committed under certain extenuating circumstances. The principle
involved suggests that reason would, at the time of a killing, be disturbed
or obscured by passion to an extent which might render ordinary or rea-
sonable people liable to act rashly or without due deliberation or
reflection and instead from passion rather than judgment. Provocation
affects the quality of the offender's state of mind as an indicator of moral
blameworthiness.1 -3 Thus, the defense of provocation exists with respect to
a charge of murder even though all the elements of the definition of
murder have been established; it is an allowance made for human frailty
and a recognition that a killing, even an intentional one, is extenuated by
the loss of self-control caused by adequate provocation, and is less heinous
than an intentional killing by a person in possession of his self-control.'54
In order to determine whether murder should be mitigated to man-
slaughter, the circumstances surrounding the homicide are examined and
an attempt is made to discover if the victim provoked the murder. This
examination of the victim's behavior is an essential difference from the
Model Penal Code requirements--only at common law is there a direct
provocative nexus requirement between the victim and the insult. Thus,
provocation is properly regarded as legal recognition that an inquiry into
the reasons for the actor's formulation of intent to kill might reveal factors
significant for the grading of the offense.5 5 Racist abuses leveled by the
victim, therefore, validly form part of the inquiry into the criminal culpa-
bility of the offender.
Whether the provocation defense is properly categorized as a partial
excuse or partial justification is disputed."56 Seen as a partial justification,
3. The accused must actually have been provoked and the murder must
have been committed in a sudden heat of passion-that is, the murder
must have occurred following the provocation and before there was a
reasonable opportunity for the passions to cool;
4. There must have been a causal connection between the provocation,
the passion, and the fatal act.
See generally Sims v. State, 573 A.2d 1317 (Md. 1990); Glenn v. State, 511 A.2d 1110 (Md.
Ct. Spec. App. 1986), cert. denied, 516 A.2d 569 (Md. 1986); Carter v. State, 505 A.2d 545
(Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1986); Tripp v. State, 374 A.2d 384 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1977); White-
head, 262 A.2d at 316.
153. MODEL PENAL CODE, supra note 143, § 210.3 cmt 5(a).
154. In Cox, the court defined voluntary manslaughter to include "intentional homi-
cide, done in a sudden heat of passion, caused by adequate provocation, before there has
been a reasonable opportunity for the passion to cool." 534 A.2d at 1335; see also Maher, 10
Mich. at 168; Nelson, supra note 4, at 1012-13.
155. MODEL PENAL CODE, supra note 143, § 210.3 cmt. 5(a).
156. JosHuA DRESSLER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CRIMINAL LAW 231-32 (2d ed.
1999) [hereinafter DRESSLER, CASES AND MATERIALS]; JOSHUA DRESSIER, UNDERSTANDING
CRIMINAL LAW § 31.07(A)-(B) (3d ed. 2001) [hereinafter DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING
CRIMINAL LAW];JEREMY HORDER, PROVOCATION AND RESPONSIBILITY 85-86 (1996).
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the moral notion that the punishment of wrongdoers is justifiable surfaces
as a veiled rational. This formulation itself creates a moral problem, as it is
disconcerting to suggest that there is less societal harm, and accordingly
less criminal responsibility, for a victim's death given his or her immoral
or offensive behavior. 57 In this vein, it is inappropriate to construe provo-
cation as a doctrine of justification as the victim's immoral conduct
should not, theoretically, jeopardize their life. 158
While it is arguably never morally right to kill a wrongdoer, it is
implicit in the construction of provocation as justification that the de-
ceased provocateur is complicit in orchestrating the loss of self-control of
the accused. '59 Similar to the contributory negligence doctrine, the ac-
cused, under this formulation of provocation doctrine, is at least partially
morally justified in responding punitively against the deceased offender.
Accordingly, the paradigmatic facts in a provocation case do not involve
the prototypical innocent victim, rather there are arguable moral wrongs
committed by all parties involved in the crime-both victim and perpe-
trator.'60 Indeed, it may be disingenuous to claim that the provocation
doctrine does not involve a certain amount of victim-blaming, or at least
conduct-blaming, as the actions of the victim by necessity inform the de-
liberation of what is adequate or reasonable provocation, its seriousness
and the accused's corresponding ability to control him or herself.
In the realm of a violent response to a racial offense or insult, the
victim intentionally inflicts wounds that are orchestrated to be devastating.
It is unlikely that a racially abusive victim is unaware of possible conse-
quences of his abuses; indeed, the provocateur likely recognizes and
intends the provocative effect of his words or deeds. Just as a defendant
claiming self-defense must properly tender the conduct of the victim, so
too in articulating racial abuse as provocative must the conduct of the vic-
tim be critically examined.' 6' The examination is two-fold.
Common law provocation has both an objective and subjective
framework for this analysis. Traditionally, courts limited the circumstances
of adequate provocation by casting generalizations about reasonable hu-
man behavior into rules of law that structured the doctrine. Adequacy was
157. Joshua Dressier, Rethinking Heat of Passion:A Defense in Search of a Rationale, 73 J.
CRiM. L & CRIMINOLOGY 421,456-58 (1982).
158. Id. There are, of course, other defenses where the victim's immoral behavior
does jeopardize their life, such as self-defense.
159. A.J. Ashworth, The Doctrine of Provocation, 35 CAMB. L.J. 292,307-08 (1976).
160. Id.
161. 1 recognize and appreciate the many valid reasons for limiting the provocation
defense, including both its sexist and homophobic application. It is a challenge of using
this doctrine to pragmatically and critically carve out a balanced application of the doc-
trine that does not further oppress and dehumanize already marginalized groups. See
Nelson, supra note 4, at 1042.
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measured by reference to the objective standard of the hypothetical "rea-
sonable man.' 62
Further, a series of categories emerged to define conduct that a jury
might deem adequate provocation. First and foremost, a physical attack
might constitute provocation, though not every technical battery could
suffice.'6 13 Of course, even a violent blow would be inadequate if the de-
ceased were entitled to use force, for example in self-defense. Mutual
combat became another established category of provocation.1 6 ' Less
clearly, a threat of physical attack might constitute provocation, at least in
extreme cases. Unlawful arrest would sometimes suffice, and the law fre-
quently recognized witnessing adultery as provocation for intentional
homicide of either the unfaithful spouse or the paramour.161 Certain other
acts-chiefly violent or sexual assault on a close relative-might also con-
stitute adequate provocation. Importantly, the courts excluded some
situations from the jury's consideration altogether. Thus, it became an es-
tablished rule at common law that words alone, no matter how insulting,
could not amount to adequate provocation.166 This restriction does not
form part of the expanded Model Penal Code provision-extreme emo-
tional or mental disturbance may, in fact, be generated by words.
Therefore, as a point of departure for critical psychology, it is fair to inter-
pret the MPC version of provocation as allowing for greater infusion.
The above-mentioned acts mitigate homicide to manslaughter be-
cause they create passion in the defendant such that any ensuing violence
is not considered the product of free will. 167 Critical psychology is impli-
cated by the possibility of passion generated by racialized psychological
issues which adversely affect free will. Provocation, as a doctrine, allows
for the possibility that some instances of intentional homicide may be as
attributable to the extraordinary nature of the situation as to the moral
depravity of the actor.1
68
162. MODEL PENAL CODE, supra note 143, 5 210.3 cmt. 5(a).
163. Id.
164. Id.; see also DRESSLER, CASES AND MATERIALS, supra note 156; DRESSLER, UNDER-
STANDING CRIMINAL LAW, supra note 156; HORDER, supra note 156; Dressier, supra note 157.
165. MODEL PENAL CODE, supra note 143, 5 210.3 cnt. 5(a) (outlining a feminist
critique of the sexist origins of provocation defense, which calls for the complete rejection
of the defense).
166. Id. § 210.3 cmt. 5(a). The only apparent exception concerned informational
words disclosing a fact that would have been provocation had the actor observed it him-
self. Id.
167. DRESSLER, CASES AND MATERIALS, supra note 156, at 261-63; DRESSLER, UNDER-
STANDING CRIMINAL LAW, supra note 156, at 528-29.
168. See Jerome Michael & Herbert Wechsler, A Rationale of the Law of Homicide 11, 37
COLUM. L. REV. 1261, 1281 (1937) ("The more strongly [most persons] would be moved
to kill by circumstances of the sort that provoked the actor to the homicidal act, and the
more difficulty they would experience in resisting the impulse to which he yielded, the
less does his succumbing serve to differentiate his character from theirs.").
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The slighter the provocation, measured against the reasonable per-
son, the more reason for defining the actor's behavior as idiosyncratic and
to see the result as his own extraordinary susceptibility to intense passion,
or deficiency of reason. 69 However, this objective analysis cannot be equi-
tably applied without some removal of the reasonable person from the
realm of the abstract-there should be some subjectivization and contex-
tualization to ensure that the objective standard reflects societal realities. I
have suggested elsewhere that it is in this regard that critical psychology
could prove useful:
Clearly, in order for the reasonable person to be "similarly situ-
ated and similarly insulted" and to assess racial abuse, the
context of the reality and legacy of racism must be considered.
Surprisingly and unfortunately, the consequences on the body,
mind, and spirit of living in a world where one is subject to
systemic discrimination on a regular basis have largely been
unexplored by criminal justice systems. The courts are in a
pivotal role of evaluating expert evidence in a manner that will
not add to the vulnerabilities of those who come to them
seeking justice. "Only by integrating scientific advancements
with our ideals ofjustice can law remain a part of the living fi-
ber of our civilization."
170
For provocation to be adequate, it must be "calculated to inflame the
passion of a reasonable man and tend to cause him to act for the moment
from passion rather than reason." 7 ' Racial epithets, or the weaponry of
words, are a quintessential example of calculated attacks intentionally
meant to inflame or wound the person at whom they are directed. To
determine what is reasonable or adequate provocation, the factfinder must
consider what would naturally tend to produce such passion in ordinary
people that self-control is lost and one acts on impulse without reflec-
172tion.
Bohanon utilizes the epithet "[B]lack bitch," which implicated both
the race and sex of the victim. A simple electronic search reveals that this
particular slur was used in over 200 reported cases 73 to abuse Black
169. MODEL PENAL CODE, supra note 143, § 210.3 cmt. 5(a).
170. Nelson, supra note 4, at 1034 (quoting Fisher v. United States, 328 U.S. 463, 494
(1946) (Murphy, J., dissenting)).
171. Carter v. State, 505 A.2d 545, 548 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1986) (quoting PERKINS,
supra note 5, at 56).
172. See United States. v. Roston, 986 F.2d 1287, 1294 (9th Cir. 1993) (BoocheverJ.,
concurring).
173. I confess my surprise at obtaining 211 hits in my search of federal and state cases
where the specific term "Black bitch" was used in facts leading to lawsuits. See Lexis
search, supra note 6.
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women.174 The reported cases no doubt comprise only the tip of the ice-
berg. The searches referenced in this Article reveal that words are indeed
frequently and intentionally deployed in abusive ways.
17 5
The victims, the Walkers, were naturalized citizens of the United
States who emigrated from Jamaica. Thinking Mr. Bohanon to be down
on his luck, the victims befriended him and introduced him to their
friends. When the Walkers expressed disapproval of the romantic interest
Bohanon showed in their niece, they started to receive threatening and
vile letters. Bohanon sent between 100 and 300 such letters. 176 The letters
often contained obscenities directed to the Walkers, such as the following:
Yo mama is the deadest piece of third world dog sewage nigger
in the grave of Foney ass Jamaica. Worms crawl all over her
rotten carcus and she loves it.... This dead bitches skin has
peeled off and her hair is so dry it feels like cardboard, I mean
this bitch is dead.Your wife is next and when she hits the grave
she will look like a big tub of nasty ancient. While doing the
autopsy before her funeral, they are going to cut her rectum
out and those sick doctors are going to fuck her with a big
greasy louiville slugger until the bottom fall out of that rotten
dead body. They will be vendictive and fuck her in the ears
and eye sockets[,] piss on her dead carcus then take that wet
greasy bat and beat her whole body until it sweals and sweal-
ters up like a balloon.... They will then urine on it, ten or
fifteen different people and then prepare that black pile of shit
for the wake. A word from you mother: Son I feel like a dried
up bitch, I'm wrapped in worms like a dead mummy, it's
177
mommy.
The language Bohanon used is deeply offensive on many levels in-
cluding, but not limited to, race, sex, national origin, and sexuality. Much
of this language might insight responsive violence, but the provocative
potential of the racialized abuse is particularly relevant since the court in
174. See, e.g., Reynolds v. USX Corp., 56 Fed. Appx. 80, 82 (3d Cir. 2003) ("dumb
[B]lack bitch"); Lacy v. Amtrak, 205 F3d 1333, 1333 (4th Cir. 2000) ("Amtrak manager
called Lacy a '[B]lack bitch'); Martin v. City of Silverton, Williamson 43 Fed. Appx. 948,
950 (6th Cir. 2002) ("How do you like that you [Bilack bitch?"); Starks v. New Par, 181
E3d 103, 103 (6th Cir. 1999) ("called her a [B]lack bitch: and by singling her out and
blaming her for inadequate performance"); Carter v. Chrysler Corp., 173 F 3d 693, 696
(8th Cir. 1999) ("'Keep your [B]lack ass down the line, bitch'. .. and referred to her as
'[B]lack mother-fucking bitch' or just'[B]lack bitch' ").
175. See Lexis search, supra note 6.
176. The exact amount of letters is unknown as when the Walkers first informed the
police of this abuse, they were told to throw out the letters and that there was really noth-
ing that could be done. Bohanon, 290 F3d at 873.
177. Id. at 872.
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Bohanon recognized that the Walkers had suffered psychological injury
from the con imunications. Specifically, the court accepted the testimony
that the Walkers had been humiliated, lived in fear and were understanda-
bly stressed by these incidents.
Had the Walkers responded to Bohanon's letters with violence, they
would deserve sentence mitigation.7 9 However, in that situation, the
common law, as codified in most jurisdictions, would deny this relief. In
so doing, the law denies the reality of psychological injury acknowledged
both by the critical psychology and the Bohanon court. At this critical
nexus, therefore, the ability of the traditional American common law doc-
trine breaks down to abstraction in its dismissal of the provocative
potential of words alone.
180
Of course, the jury would still need to be satisfied that the provoca-
tion at issue did, in fact, produce a mental state of passion in the offender.
Provocation is not an applicable defense unless the accused was actually
provoked.' 8' As stated in the MPC, "[t]he underlying rationale is that the
individual whose passions are not aroused by provocation merits the same
condemnation and punishment as one who kills without provocation of
any sort.
' 182
178. The Walkers testified as to their fear, humiliation, and embarrassment. They
changed their behavior, becoming much more cautious than they had been. The fact that
they suffered psychological injury is clearly inferable from the record. Id. at 876.
179. Michael & Wechsler, supra note 168, at 1281-82.
180. The general rule is that words alone are not adequate provocation. Indeed, in a
case involving the use of racial slurs and derogatory comments, the court of Appeals of
Maryland held that: "[i]nsulting words or gestures, no matter how opprobrious, do not
amount to an affray, and standing alone, do not constitute adequate provocation." Sims v
State, 573 A.2d 1317, 1322-23 (Md. 1990). In this case, someone shot and killed Michael
Bucino in the parking lot of the 602 Club in Laurel, Maryland on September 9, 1986. Id.
Jeffrey Sims claimed that he was not present and did not shoot Bucino, but a jury found to
the contrary and convicted him of second-degree murder. Sims contended that the trial
judge erred in refusing to instruct the jury concerning voluntary manslaughter. Id. Ac-
cording to the court: "Sims claimed he was entitled to a manslaughter instruction because
the evidence fairly generated the question of whether the shooter, 1) acted in hot-blooded
response to legally adequate provocation, 2) or was entitled to claim imperfect self-
defense." Id. The court found no fault with the defendant's attempt to interpose inconsis-
tent theories of defense and mitigation, but held sua sponte that the evidence was
insufficient to warrant an instruction on manslaughter. Id. The court found the words did
not constitute adequate provocation. Id. at 1323.
181. Thus, courts hold a person of exceptional restraint to a higher standard and
should not excuse him because he did not actually lose control, even though a reasonable
person would have. Similarly, if the actor actually regained self-control before killing, he
would be guilty of murder, even though a reasonable person might not have cooled.
MODEL PENAL CODE, supra note 143, § 210.3 cmt. 5(a); see also State v. Faulkner, 483 A.2d
759 (Md. 1984); C.J.S., supra note 5, % 48, 50.
182. MODEL PENAL CODE, supra note 143, § 210.3 cmt. 5(a).
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Hence, the provocation doctrine requires a subjective assessment of
the psychological situation of the accused-even a psychological situation
rendered disparate by racism and its effects. This subjective mental state
should, accordingly, be informed by the critical psychology where appro-
priate. Such outsider psychology, which recognizes the subjectivity of
experience, especially as it implicates race, ethnicity and gender, comports
with the court's recognition in Bohanon that the Walkers were psychologi-
cally injured, stressed, and humiliated. People with weaker coping skills
and resources than the Walkers, might have had their "human frailties"
exposed, might have reacted with less restraint than the Walkers were able
to muster and, accordingly, might have needed a defense which recog-
nized the provocative capacity of racialized abuses. While the common
law defense of provocation would likely deny mitigated sentencing in the
hypothetical posed above, the Model Penal Code's more expansive scope
would allow for greater consideration of critical psychology in the
Bohanon situation.
B. Extreme Emotional Disturbance
The Model Penal Code departs from the common law defense of
provocation in significant ways. As codification of homicide laws engen-
dered a variety of approaches to the offense of murder"3, the drafters of
the MPC rejected many of these developments. In promulgating the
Model Penal Code, the drafters noted that "the law ... was not well de-
veloped" and the "perception on which the Model Code was based was
that this pattern of statutory treatment was substantially deficient for fail-
ing to confront the major policy questions posed by the offense."1 84
Consequently, Model Penal Code section 210.3 defined manslaugh-
ter as follows:
(1) Criminal homicide constitutes manslaughter when:
it is committed recklessly; or a homicide which would
otherwise be murder is committed under the influence of ex-
treme mental or emotional disturbance for which there is
reasonable explanation or excuse. The reasonableness of such ex-
planation or excuse shall be determined from the viewpoint of a
183. Beginning with Pennsylvania in 1794, many states sought to distinguish first-
degree murder, which was premeditated and deliberated murder, from other murders in
order to limit the application of the death penalty. Id. 5 210.2 cmt. 2. At the same time,
while recognizing manslaughter as a separate offense, most states had no explicit definition,
preferring instead to rely on the definition provided by common law. Id. § 210.3 cmt. 1.
Other states adopted definitions substantially similar to the common law definition, but
divided manslaughter into different categories, such as voluntary and involuntary, for the
purposes of sentencing. Id. § 210.3 cmt. 2.
184. Id. 5 210.3 cmt. 2.
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person in the actor's situation under the circumstances as he be-
lieves them to be.
(2) Manslaughter is a felony of the second degree.'8'
Accordingly, extreme emotional disturbance, the MPC version of
provocation, has two principle elements: the defendant must have acted
under the influence of extreme emotional disturbance and there must
have been a reasonable explanation or excuse for such extreme emotional
disturbance, the reasonableness of which is to be determined from the
viewpoint of a person in the defendant's situation under the circum-
stances as the defendant believed them to be.186 The first requirement is
wholly subjective as it involves a determination that the particular defen-
dant did in fact act under extreme emotional disturbance, that the claimed
explanation as to the cause of his action is not contrived or a sham.' 8 The
second component was designed to replace the rigid rules that had devel-
oped with respect to the sufficiency of particular types of provocation,
such as the rule that words alone can never be sufficiently provocative.""'
This expansion allows for a consideration of racial imagery, symbol-
ism, or articulations as violence. The ultimate test remains, however,
objective.There must be a reasonable explanation or excuse for the actor's
disturbance. In order to determine whether defendant's emotional distur-
bance, and not the act of killing, was supported by a reasonable
explanation or excuse, the subjective internal situation in which the de-
fendant found himself and the external circumstances as he perceived
them should be viewed from the standpoint of the accused (no matter
how inaccurate that perception may have been). An assessment must be
made of whether the explanation or excuse for the emotional disturbance
was reasonable so as to entitle the defendant to a reduction of the crime
charged from murder to manslaughter. 89
Critical psychology has much to add to this analysis, not only with
regard to the reasonableness of any emotional disturbance based upon
racialized violence, but also as to the normative basis. It is imperative to
recognize that the test is not whether it is reasonable to kill but whether
the emotional disturbance was reasonable given the situation as the ac-
cused assessed it. According to Herbert Wechsler, one of the architects of
the MPC, "The purpose [of this expanded version of common law
provocation] was explicitly to give full scope to what amounts to a plea in
mitigation based upon a mental or emotional trauma of significant di-
185. Id. § 210.3 (emphasis added).
186. People v. Casassa, 404 N.E. 2d 1310, 1315-16 (N.Y 1980).
187. Id. at 1316.
188. Id.
189. Id.
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mensions, with the jury asked to show whatever empathy it can."' 90 Criti-
cal psychology speaks directly to such trauma and racialized stress and is
capable of infusion into the criminal law to grant mitigation based upon
the mental sequelae of racism. 9'
Accordingly, the MPC made significant changes to the common law
definition of manslaughter.' Most importantly, the MPC drafters in-
tended extreme mental or emotional disturbance to be both broader and
more subjective than provocation was at common law.19 3 The MPC de-
fense is a considerably expanded version of the common law defense of
114heat of passion on sudden provocation.
For instance, the MPC allowance for distress in the abstract is a sig-
nificant departure, especially insofar as critical psychology is concerned.
The MPC does not require that the actor's emotional distress arise from
some injury, affront or other provocative act of the deceased.' 95 Emotional
distress and some reasonable explanation for its existence is sufficient. The
MPC states:
Under the Code, mitigation may be appropriate where the ac-
tor believes that the deceased is responsible for some injustice
to another or even where he strikes out in a blinding rage and
kills an innocent bystander. In such cases, the cause and inten-
sity of the actor's emotion may be less indicative of moral
depravity than would be a homicidal response to a blow to
196
one s person.
Accordingly, by not following the common law's traditional adher-
ence to rigid rules limiting provocation to certain circumstances, the
MPC allows the trier of fact to decide, where there is evidence of ex-
treme emotional or mental disturbance, whether the circumstances
190. Herbert Wechsler, Codification of Crininal Law in the United States: The Model
Penal Code, 68 COLUM. L. REV. 1425, 1446 (1968).
191. The term racism includes an ideology of superiority that categorizes and ranks
various groups, negative attitudes, and beliefs about outgroups and differential treatment of
outgroups by individuals and societal institutions.
192. First, it excluded negligence, basing manslaughter instead on recklessness as to
risks of which an actor was actually aware. MODEL PENAL CODE, supra note 143, § 210.3
cmt. 3. Second, under a separate provision, it allowed for imperfect justification. Id. As a
result, if an actor killed in self-defense but did so recklessly or negligently, he would be
excused from the offense of murder but guilty of, respectively, manslaughter or negligent
homicide because recklessness or negligence sufficed to establish those offenses. Id. § 210.3
cmt. 6. Third, the Model Penal Code entirely rejected the concept of misdemeanor-
manslaughter. Id. § 210.3 cmt. 3.
193. See id. § 210.3 cmt. 3.
194. See Patterson v. NewYork, 432 U.S. 197 (1977).
195. MODEL PENAL CODE, supra note 143, § 210.3 cmt. 5(a).
196. Id.
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provide a reasonable excuse for the actor's mental condition.19 7 By aban-
doning preconceived notions of what is adequate provocation, the MPC
allows a jury to consider critical psychology in its deliberations.
Most importantly, the MPC broadens the objective analysis of
provocation. In assessing the reasonableness of the excuse, the relevant
viewpoint is that of a person in the actor's "situation" under the circum-
stances as he believed them to be. 98 The MPC drafter's intentionally used
the ambiguous term "situation" to allow a rich examination of context,
while still preventing idiosyncratic individualization of the legal stan-
dard.' 99 For example, situational context allows consideration of physical
handicaps such as blindness, yet excludes idiosyncratic moral values such
as an assassin's belief that it is right to kill a political leader. °° The MPC
also explains a middle ground:
In between these extremes, however, there are matters neither
as clearly distinct from individual blameworthiness as blindness
or handicap nor as integral a part of moral depravity as a belief
in the rightness of killing. Perhaps the classic illustration is the
unusual sensitivity to the epithet "bastard" of a person born il-
legitimate. An exceptionally punctilious sense of personal
honor or an abnormally fearful temperament may also serve to
differentiate an individual actor from the hypothetical reason-
able person, yet none of these factors is wholly irrelevant to
the ultimate issue of culpability. The proper role of such factors
cannot be resolved satisfactorily by abstract definition of what may con-
201
stitute adequate provocation.
Extreme emotional disturbance, therefore, places far more emphasis
on the subjective mental state of the actor than does the common law
197. Id.
198. Id.
199. Id.
200. Id.
201. Id. (emphasis added).The Model Code endorses a formulation that affords suffi-
cient flexibility to differentiate in particular cases between those special aspects of the
actor's situation that should be deemed extreme mental or emotional disturbance material
for purpose of grading and those that should be ignored. There thus will be room for
interpretation of the word "situation," and that is precisely the flexibility desired. There
will be opportunity for argument about the reasonableness of explanation or excuse, and
that too is a ground on which argument is required. In the end, the question is whether
the actor's loss of self-control can be understood in terms that arouse sympathy in the
ordinary citizen. Section 210.3 faces this issue squarely and leaves the ultimate judgment
to the ordinary citizen in the function of a juror assigned to resolve the specific case. See
id.
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defense of provocation.2 2 The MPC does not disniss situations where the
provocative circumstance is something other than an injury inflicted by
the deceased on the actor, but rather focuses on whether some event
aroused extreme mental or emotional disturbance. 20 3 The extreme emo-
tional disturbance defense permits the defendant to show that his actions
were caused by a mental infirmity, below the level of insanity, and that he
was less culpable than an accused not so disturbed.20 ' At this juncture the
critical psychology may become particularly relevant to a racialized of-
fender. The literature may indeed provide sufficient support for an
infusion into the criminal law of information detailing the distressing,
humiliating and cumulative impact of racism, the allostatic load if you
will.
The MPC bolsters the notion of cumulative or serial provocation by
jettisoning the concept of a cooling off period, a bedrock component of
the common law.2°' The cooling off period rule temporarily limits access
to the defense even where the defendant had not actually cooled and was
still enraged at the time of the killing. The MPC, however, does not
speak to this issue and the omission of this temporal restriction on passion
leads to the conclusion that so long as the offender was laboring under
the condition of extreme emotional disturbance, for which there is a rea-
sonable explanation or excuse, the defense is appropriately considered.
The calculus of what is or is not reasonable allows for an assessment
of the cumulative and ongoing impact of racism, as analyzed by critical
psychology. Where appropriate, such infusion makes acceptance of rele-
vant critical psychology pragmatic, equitable and necessary. Wechsler's
explanation of the MPC heat of passion provision indicates that the ex-
treme emotional disturbance defense is just what it says-a broad
allowance for mental trauma, whatever the source, such that the jury
might properly consider the full scope and impact of the relevant impair-
ment.
C. Diminished Capacity
Turning from heat of passion defenses, diminished capacity provides
another venue for consideration of critical psychology. The diminished
capacity doctrine allows a criminal defendant to introduce evidence of
mental abnormality at trial for one of two reasons.. The first possibility is
202. It may also allow an inquiry into areas which have been treated as part of the
law of diminished capacity and insanity. Id.
203. Id.
204. People v. Patterson, 347 N.E.2d 898, 905-06 (N.Y. 1976).
205. At common law, the passion of the reasonable man subsides and reason reasserts
its logic "as the provoking event grows stale." See MODEL PENAL CODE, supra note 143,
§ 210.3, cmt. 5(a).
206. Id.
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essentially a rule of evidence which allows for negation of a mental ele-
ment of the crime charged, so as to create a reasonable doubt in the
minds of the jurors regarding the presence of a statutorily required mens
rea element, thereby exonerating the defendant of that charge.0 7 Used in
this fashion, diminished capacity is a failure of proof defense 20 8 as it ne-
gates specific intent such as malice, premeditation, or deliberation in
murder trials by the tendering of evidence establishing the offender's
mental incapacity or abnormality, short of insanity. °9
Diminished capacity may also be invoked at trial as a defense to
homicide offenses. Rather than negating mens rea, its utility stems from
the fact that it is an affirmative defense that provides either an excuse or a
justification for the crime, thereby offering the opportunity for a miti-
gated sentence. Diminished capacity may permit proof of mental
abnormality or defect severe enough to preclude liability for murder (of
any degree).2 l ° In this way, evidence of diminished capacity may be used
to reduce the degree of a crime for which the defendant may be con-
victed, even if the defendant's conduct satisfied all the formal elements of
an higher offense. A successful assertion of this defense results in the ac-
cused being adjudged guilty of a lesser degree of the crime because
mental or emotional impairment, short of insanity, mitigated their moral
blameworthiness and culpability for the act.2 1 Accordingly, this version of
diminished capacity has been conceptualized as a partial or incomplete
defense based on mental abnormality or defect.2 2
207. Stephen J. Morse, Criminal Law: Undiminished Confusion in Diminished Capacity,
75 J. CriM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1, 1 (1984); see also MODEL PENAL CODE, supra note 143,
210.3 cmt. 4(b).
208. See Paul H. Robinson, Criminal Law Defenses:A Systemic Analysis, 82 COLUM. L.
REV. 199, 202-05 (1982).
209. At a homicide trial, the accused likely has a constitutional right to call expert
testimony about his or her capacity to form the required mental element. Accordingly,
mental health experts could be called to explain any relevant critical psychology at it im-
plicates mens rea. Since due process requires that the prosecution prove each and every
element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt, the exclusion of such probative informa-
tion, which directly impacts upon the requisite mens rea, would allow the prosecution to
secure a conviction without establishing the mental element beyond a reasonable doubt.
Professor Dressler goes one step further to suggest that the presentation of evidence re-
garding diminished capacity may also be constitutionally protected pursuant to the Sixth
Amendment right to introduce competent and relevant evidence. See Joshua Dressler,
Reaffirming the Moral Legitimacy of the Doctrine of Diminished Capacity: A Brief Reply to Profes-
sor Morse, 75 J. CRiM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 953, 953 n.6 (1984); MODEL PENAL CODE, supra
note 143, § 210.3 cmt. 4(b).
210. MODEL PENAL CODE, supra note 143, § 210.3 cmt. 4(b).
211. See Morse, supra note 207, at 1;Dressler, supra note 209, at 954.
212. Diminished capacity has also been seen as an implicit redefinition of premedita-
tion to require mature and meaningful reflection by a mind capable of comprehending the
gravity of the act or as judicial recognition of a mental abnormality no matter how long
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The difference between insanity and diminished capacity is one of
degree. Just as the criminal law differentially punishes people based upon
gradations in mens rea, no principled basis exists for ignoring gradations
where mitigating defenses are concerned because, "[t]he proferred evi-
dence is no less reliable in the case of diminished capacity than with
insanity. As long as the jury, not the 'expert', resolves the moral issues of
accountability, there is no good reason for closing our eyes to partial re-
sponsibility claims., 2'3 Again, critical psychology becomes relevant as
certain accused persons may suffer from diagnosable ailments generated
by the violence of racism that do not rise to the level of insanity.
That being said, some scholars believe the doctrine of diminished
capacity in the context of murder focuses on the wrong question. Profes-
sor Morse, for instance, advocates that rather than focusing upon
"difficulties, burdens, problems, and misfortunes suffered by the perpetra-
tor" we should ask, "how hard is it not to offend the law?, 21 4 Morse
believes that the response to this question would reveal that it is not that
hard to avoid breaking the law. He argues:
How hard is it not to offend the law? How hard is it not to
kill, burgle, rob, rape, and steal? The ability to resist the tempta-
tion to violate the law is not akin to the ability required to be
a fine athlete, artist, plumber, or doctor. The person is not being
asked to exercise a dfficult skill; rather, he or she is being asked simply
to refrain from engaging in antisocial conduct. Think, too, of all the fac-
tors mitigating against such behavior: parental, religious, and school
training; peer pressures and cultural expectations; internalized stan-
dards ("superego");fear of capture and punishment;fear of shame; and
a host of others. Not all such factors operate on all actors or
with great strength: there will be wide individual differences
based on life experiences and, perhaps, biological factors.
Nonetheless, for all persons there are enormous forces arrayed
against lawbreaking.
While persuasive, Morse's underlying assumption must be that the
accused is an er(raced) 216 person as many of the factors stressed as mitigating
or carefully the accused considered his course of action. MODEL PENAL CODE, supra note
143, § 210.3.
213. Dressier, supra note 209, at 960 (a negligent killing is punished less severely than
a reckless one, even though the differences between the two killings may be only in the
degree of risk; similarly, statutes frequently divide intentional killings into degrees of
homicide based upon the strength of the intention (such as whether it was extreme mental
or emotional disturbance versus premeditated and deliberate)).
214. Morse, supra note 207, at 30.
215. Id. at 31 (emphasis added).
216. I use this term to denote an individual abstracted to the point where racial iden-
tity is erased.
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against lawbreaking have particularly responsive, defensive and even revo-
lutionary messages for persons of color-messages which some, outside
communities of color, may find antisocial. Indeed, the role of the Black
Church, family, and school were integral to the civil rights movement-a
movement that at its initiation involved lawbreaking and behavior then
• • 211
seen as antisocial. It is indeed hard to avoid breaking the law in some
situations into which persons of color may be forced. For instance, in the
case of the cross-burning on the private property of a Black couple, might
the law be asking too much to demand that the couple faced with this
racialized violence and intimidation not be excused from or justified in a
violent response?218 Professor Paul Butler has analyzed the utility of using
subversion, and even violence, to change unjust laws:
The struggle of African Americans, and many concerned oth-
ers, to crush both the "peculiar institution" of slavery and Jim
Crow segregation, is well known and shall not be rehearsed
here.... The first observation is that the conversion of these
discriminatory laws was caused, in part, by violence and sub-
219
version.
Further the very definition of antisocial conduct is contextual-
what is antisocial in one situation might be seen as legitimate self-defense
in another. Similarly, what is antisocial to one person might be seen as
mere speech to another-what is antisocial behavior to persons from a
majority might be seen as provoked behavior from a racialized commu-
nity perspective.The definition of antisocial or violent behavior cannot be
217. Martin Luther King,Jr. observed:
[T]here is a type of constructive, nonviolent tension which is necessary for
growth .... The purpose of [civil disobedience] is to create a situation so cri-
sis-packed that it will inevitably open the door to negotiation .... We know
through painful experience that freedom is never voluntarily given by the
oppressor; it must be demanded by the oppressed.
Martin Luther King, Jr., Letter from Birmingham Jail, cited in Paul Butler, By Any Means Nec-
essary: Using Violence and Subversion to Change Unjust Law, 50 UCLA L. REv. 721, 773 n.96
(2003).
218. Indeed, the law has traditionally protected the sanctity of the home and private
property with a vengeance. See United States v. Peterson, 483 F2d 1222, 1236 (D.C. Cir.
1973); State v. Nieto, 130 N.E. 663, 664 (Ohio 1920); State v. Walker, 598 N.E.2d 89
(Ohio Ct. App. 1991); State v. Catlin, 564 N.E.2d 750, 753-54 (Ohio Ct. App. 1990); Stu-
art P. Green, Castles and Cajackers: Proportionality and the Use of Deadly Force in Defense of
Dwellings and Vehicles, 1999 U. ILL. L. REv. 1,30, 31 n.135 (1999).
219. Butler, supra note 217, at 726 (considering how radical tactics can help change
discriminatory laws in the United States and concluding that the politics of respectability
should not limit the tactics that minorities choose in their quest for racial justice, but mo-
rality should).
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artificially abstracted to the point where race is removed from the analy-
sis-a more nuanced approach to this endeavor is required. Furthermore,
justifying or excusing the behavior of such a defendant does not result in
acquittal. Rather, as with provocation and extreme emotional disturbance,
the diminished capacity defense serves only as a partial defense to reduce
duration of imprisonment or to preclude execution.
While as Morse stresses, "the function of conviction and sentencing
is to punish the actor for what he has done, rather than for who he IS",
the affirmative defenses offered by the criminal law clearly provide for the
possibility that what the actor has done necessarily calibrates with who he
or she is. Indeed the "reasonable person" standard found in the defenses of
provocation and self-defense necessarily focuses some of the inquiry on
the characteristics of the accused. 22' Further, the affirmative defenses,
compartmentalized between excuse and justification, do not function in
the abstract-who the accused is, and how she has become that person is
relevant to the calculus of whether she is worthy of mitigation for the
crime committed. It is appropriate to consider any reasonably provable
factors that tend to demonstrate that the actors' accountability for their
actions is less than that of normal persons under normal circumstances.222
Indeed as Professor Dressler has indicated:
In our quest to treat people with dignity, we also must not
cruelly ignore evidence of illness or other relevant forms of
impairment. Each person is unique. We treat criminal actors
with dignity when we treat each individual as unique. That
means we should consider, and not ignore, the ways in which
they differ from other people. One difference may be their
mental impairment. If all people, as a species, possess free will,
not all people command an equal degree of free will.
223
Accordingly, the critical psychology above should be considered
during criminal trials, where relevant, to elucidate the issues of mental
impairment which might actually relate to significant social differences in
society, such as race and ethnicity. While admittedly a social construct, the
notion of race as carrying societal currency has operated to shape the lives
of all Americans irrespective of color and its ramifications impact Ameri-
cans' lives in both trivial and profound ways.
220. Morse, supra note 207, at 32.
221. The law of self-defense has tended to infuse the reasonable person with the
characteristics of the accused, and to examine the circumstances and contexts in which the
accused found themselves. See State v. Norman, 378 S.E.2d 8 (N.C. 1989).
222. See Dressler, supra note 209, at 959; Dressier, supra note 157, at 422; Joshua
Dressier, Substantive Criminal Law Through the Looking Glass of Rummel v. Estelle: Propor-
tionality and Justice as Endangered Doctrines, 34 Sw. L.J. 1063, 1073-79 (1981).
223. Dressler, supra note 209, at 959.
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As WE.B. DuBois has indicated, "[t]he problem of the twentieth
century is the problem of the color line.' 22' Given the reality of historical
and contemporary racism in twenty-first century America and its resultant
psychological and physiological effects, there is still significant explanatory
power, whether excusatory or justificatory, to be gleaned from the ravages
of racism in the criminal law context.225 Mitigating psychological factors
may stem from this reality of the color line and should be considered just
as any other relevant evidence of mental impairment should be examined
in the criminal trial setting. Hence mitigatory considerations for the sen-
tence of the accused should be examined through the lens of a
defendant's lived reality. This reality may reveal significant mental health
issues which impact upon the issue of moral guilt and criminal culpability.
Indeed, as Justice Frankfurter noted in his dissent in Fisher v. United States,
"[m]urder cases are apt to be peculiarly individualized."
2 26
Fisher involved a Black defendant who intentionally strangled a
White librarian. While Fisher was not legally insane, he was "mentally
subnorma[1]"2 2 7 He suffered from an aggressive psychopathic condition
that affected his behavior. He killed suddenly, but intentionally; yet, he
acted only after the victim called him a "Black nigger." He was sentenced
to death. Dressler's comments about Justice Frankfurter's dissent are apt:
Fisher's impairment, and the victim's racial epithet, may not
have been the legal causes of his conduct. His free will acts
were the cause. Because he had free will, and chose to kill, he
should be punished. But my intuition tells me that the infor-
mation proferred by the defense would have been highly
relevant to morally sensitive jurors in their decision regarding
Fisher's degree of moral guilt. Jurors might conclude that it
was harder for Fisher than for the juror not to kill.
2
2-
In this way the culpability of Fisher as a Black man suffering from
mental impairment, whether brought on by, or merely exacerbated by, the
224. WE.B. Du Bois, THE SouLs OF BLACK FOLK 41 (1995).
225. While excuses, such as diminished capacity, negate personal blameworthiness
and do not mitigate the harm that has occurred, the proposals made here necessarily touch
on possible justificatory frameworks within the confines of this affirmative defense. Spe-
cifically, if the capacity of an accused of color is diminished due to victimization from
racialized abuses, that may implicate the justification rational for the affirmative defense of
diminished capacity in addition to the excuse rationale. Perhaps the excuse theory more
directly correlates with the mental health information provided in Part I, while the justifi-
cation rationale is more properly considered under the heading of heat of passion.
226. 328 U.S. 463, 478 (1946) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
227. Id. at 467.
228. Dressier, supra note 209, at 961; see also Paul Butler, Radally Based Jury Nullifica-
tion: Black Power in the Criminal Justice System, 105 YALE L.J. 677,715 (1995).
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consequences of race and racism in America, should have been addressed
in a holistic fashion to better judge his moral and legal responsibility. The
abnormality, when it impairs the exercise of free will, is most relevant to
the triers of fact. When the free will of the accused is compromised in
some substantial and verifiable way, the jury ought to consider its poten-
tial as a source of mitigation, especially when the accused faces the death
penalty. Criminal sanctions might properly be vitiated due to an impair-
ment of the accused's volition (such that his intentional commission of
the actus reus is questionable) or cognitive functions (such that his ability
to form the mens rea) are compromised. 229 Dressler explains this reasoning
in greater detail:
[I]nternal forces that serve to prevent law-breaking do not op-
erate equally, or at all, on all people. Where there exists reliable
evidence that a particular defendant suffers from some condi-
tion, the existence of which has substantial explanatory force
regarding the criminal events and helps to explain why the ac-
tor committed the crime, then we have learned something
very important about the actor (but not about the ultimate
harm) that ought not to be ignored. We should not punish
persons for possessing bad character, nor should we mitigate or
exculpate because of good character. But we ought to consider
explanations for behavior that indicate that the actors' personal
blameworthiness for the events-their moral accountability for
the harm-is less than we ordinarily would expect.2 z°
Obviously psychiatric or psychological testimony about diminished
capacity must be included in such analysis. This prospect is controversial.
Many fear the mental health professional will usurp the role of the judge
and jury.23'
229. See HERBERT L. PACKER, THE LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL SANCTION 134 (1968);
GEORGE P. FLETCHER, RETHINKING CRIMINAL LAW 461-63 (1978).
230. Dressier, supra note 209, at 959. There is an obvious need for the inclusion of
psychiatric or psychological testimony about diminished capacity in such cases. This pros-
pect is not without controversy. Many fear the role of the mental health profe~sional as a
usurpation of the role of the judge and jury. PETER R. BREGGIN & GINGER Ross BREGGIN,
THE WAR AGAINST CHILDREN 159 (1994); Citizens Commission on Human Rights Official
Website, at http://wvw.cchr.org/racism/toc.htm (last visited Dec. 4, 2003); Peter R.
Breggin, Campaigns Against Racist Federal Programs by the Study for Psychiatry and Psychology,
http://www.breggin.com/racistfedpol.htm (last visited Dec. 4, 2003).
231. Citizens Commission on Human Rights, Creating Racism: Psychiatry's Betrayal in
the Guise of Help, http://www.cchr.org/racism/toc.htm (last visited Dec. 4, 2003); Peter R.
Breggin, Campaigns Against Racist Federal Programs by the Center for the Study of Psychiatry
and Psychology, 1 J. AFR.-Am. MEN 3 (1995/96), http://www.breggin.com/racistfedpol.
html (last visited Dec. 4, 2003); PETER R. BREGGIN & GINGER Ross BREGGIN, THE WAR
AGAINST CHILDREN 159 (1994), at http://www'scils.rutgers.edu/~-lyonsm/psychiatry.html
(last visited Dec. 4, 2003).
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Despite the doctrinal possibilities generated by the infusion of criti-
cal psychology into the diminished capacity defense, a nagging concern
remains. Unlike provocation or extreme emotional disturbance, dimin-
ished capacity is entirely subjective in its recognition of the actor's own
mental disorder or emotional instability as a basis for partially excusing his
conduct. 232 This removal of analysis from the realm of the objective is
worrisome as it has the potential to allow for the peculiar idiosyncrasies
of the accused to propel mitigation. Accordingly, the project of dimin-
ished capacity doctrine may actually be antagonistic to critical psychology
which highlights the possibilities of disparate mental health sequelae as
reasonable and expected results of racialized violence, not as peculiar or de-
ranged freak occurrences. The critical psychology discussed above
explores the disparate mental health sequelae of persons struggling to
cope in unbearable situations-persons taxed to the breaking point so the
catalyst racialized event is the proverbial straw that breaks the camel's
back. Further research is in order to ascertain the capacity of racialized
abuses to generate defects of the sort conceptualized by diminished capac-
ity. I doubt not that this potential exists, but I am concerned for
pathologization of the Black person's experiences and responses to racial-
ized violence. Such potential for pathologization is a well-founded fear.
Pathologization shifts the focus to the mental abnormality of the actor
and away from an assessment of the deviance of racism itself and its capac-
ity to injure otherwise healthy individuals.
III. CONCERNS WITH INFUSION-IDENTITY,
PATHOLOGIZATION, AND ACCESS
"Men are so necessarily mad, that not to be mad would
amount to another form of madness. ',233
Consequences flow from one's identity. However identity is a sub-
ject which defies easy definition. Conceptually, identity theory considers
who we are, or more accurately, who we think we are and peripherally,
how others perceive us. Identity is not static, rather there is an evolution-
ary process, which implies contextual fluidity, which is itself tethered to
the groups, networks, societal structures, practices, and performances to
which people and their identities are rooted. It is not simply a mental ex-
ercise to determine whether mental disability is an identity that, much
like race, gender, and sexual orientation, marks an individual such that
societal consequences follow. Even to conceptualize disability as such oth-
232. MODEL PENAL CODE, supra note 143, § 210.3 cmt. 4(b).
233. MICHEL FOUcAULT, MADNESS AND CIVILIZATION:A HISTORY OF INSANITY IN THE
AGE OF REASON, at ix (Vintage Books 1998) (1965).
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ers this "identity" as a marker which definitionally holds limitations
within its very construction. Limitation is intrinsic in defining the iden-
tity and accordingly it marginalizes the disabled as "less than" the "abled."
Those labeled disabled are defined as lacking in relation to the "abled"
norm. Given these concerns, it might be conceptually preferable to con-
sider mental disability as a mental "vulnerability" or "mental challenge."
This is consistent with the more inclusive and sensitive language of
"physical challenge" (as opposed to physical disability), which recognizes
that the difficulties stem equally, if not predominantly, from societal con-
struction, both literal and figurative, which delimit access. A postmodern
critique 1 4 is, therefore, conceivable-a critique that acknowledges the
externalities implicated in creating the status quo and constructing mental
challenge as a site of marginalization.
In this vein, while mental vulnerabilities themselves create limita-
tions, such as the inherent challenges deriving from the status, a
postmodern analysis demands recognition of the societal manufacturing
of that which is oppressive. As with other markers of identity, it is the so-
cietal reaction and ascription of marginal status that "disables" the identity.
As a society, with the help of certain disciplines, in this context mental
health professionals, we "mark" those with mental vulnerabilities as less
than-they are alternatively ignored, marginalized, incarcerated, or other-
wise locked up. Society ascribes those with mental vulnerabilities a
marginal identity deserving of legal consideration. Hence mental
234. According to Dr. Mary Klages, Associate Professor, English Department, Univer-
sity of Colorado, Boulder:
Postmodernism then is the critique of grand narratives, the awareness that
such narratives serve to mask the contradictions and instabilities that are in-
herent in any social organization or practice. In other words, every attempt
to create "order" always demands the creation of an equal amount of"disor-
der," but a "grand narrative" masks the constructedness of these categories by
explaining that "disorder" REALLY IS chaotic and bad, and that "order"
REALLY IS rational and good. Postmodernism, in rejecting grand narratives,
favors "mini-narratives," stories that explain small practices, local events,
rather than large-scale universal or global concepts. Postmodern "mini-
narratives" are always situational, provisional, contingent, and temporary,
making no claim to universality, truth, reason, or stability.
Mary Klages, Postmodernisn, http://www.colorado.edu/English/ENGL2012Klages/
pomo.htmI (last visited Dec. 3, 2003); see also MICHEL FOUCAULT, THE ORDER OF THINGS:
AN ARCHAEOLOGY OF THE HUMAN SCIENCES (Vintage Books 1994) (1970);JEAN-FRANcOIS
LYOTARD, THE POSTMODERN CONDITION: A REPORT ON KNOWLEDGE (1984); GEORGE E.
MARCUS & MICHAEL M.J. FISCHER, ANTHROPOLOGY AS CULTURAL CRITIQUE: AN EXPERI-
MENTAL MOMENT IN THE HUMAN SCIENCES (1986); CHRISTOPHER NoRuns,
DECONSTRUCTION: THEORY AND PRACTICE (1979); Gianni Vattimo, THE END OF MODERNITY:
NIHILISM AND HERMENEUTICS IN POSTMODERN AMERICA (1998); Stephen Tyler, Post-Modern
Ethnograply: From Docunent of the Occult to Occult Document (1986), in WRITING CULTURE:
THE POETICS AND POLITICS OF ETHNOGRAPHY (James Clifford & George E. Marcus eds.,
1986).
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vulnerability, even within the context of critical psychology, is a site wor-
thy of criticality due to the possibility and propensity towards
.2 235pathologization.
That pathologization, the ascription of disease, dysfunction, or devi-
ance from the norm, has been utilized as a sword against members of
marginalized groups is an uncontroversial historical reality. Psychiatry and
psychology, like all disciplines, are constructed cultural products and
mechanisms of society. The manifestation of discrimination in such, ab-
stractly, noble professions is not surprising given that all noble endeavors,
like law, have also been co-opted for ignoble ends.2 6 This is inevitable
given that all doctrine, no matter the profession, is "man-made," inter-
preted and applied by people who, although claiming otherwise in the
interest of supposed objectivity, bring their own societal-discriminatory
baggage to bear. Thus, recognition of the possibilities for use of critical
psychology as a mechanism to further the interests of marginalized per-
sons is ironic given historical uses of mental health disciplines to subjugate
these same interests and communities. The tension created by this irony
should not, however, found the sole basis for dismissal of either the doc-
trine or the disciplines, rather the utility, and indeed the determination to
dismantle the master's house with his own tools, is a strategic decision
made with full knowledge of the ugly history.
The history of psychiatry itself reveals the paradox inherent in utiliz-
ing mental health constructs with the normative goal of achieving
liberatory ends. For instance, early psychiatrists felt that a "madman" was a
savage beast who needed to be confined, dominated, and beaten.237 Mad-
men were treated as animals based on the theory that a combination of
fear and pain would rid them of the thoughts upon which they were fix-
235. See Judith Butler, Is Kinship Always Already Heterosexual, in LEFT LECALISM/LEFr
CRITIQUE 234 (Wendy Brown & Janet Halley eds., 2002). Butler states:
Without the critical perspective ... politics relies fundamentally on an un-
knowingness-and depoliticization--of the very relations of force by which
its own field of operation is instituted. Criticality is thus not a position per se,
not a site or place that might be located within an already delimitable field,
although one must, in an obligatory catachresis, speak of sites, of fields, of
domains.
Id.
236. See e.g., Loving v. Commonwealth, 147 S.E.2d 78 (Va. 1966) (upholding the
Virginia miscegenation statutes as not violating due process or equal protection); Plessy v.
Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896) (holding that racially "separate but equal" facilities did not
violate the Thirteenth or Fourteenth Amendments); Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393
(1856) (holding that the plaintiff, being a Negro, could not be a citizen of Missouri);John-
son v. M'Intosh, 21 U.S. 543 (1823) (holding that land grants made by Indian tribes cannot
be recognized by the court).
237. See ROBERT WHITAKER, MAD IN AMERICA: BAD SCIENCE, BAD MEDICINE, AND THE
ENDURING MISTREATMENT OF THE MENTALLY ILL 4-8 (2002).
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ated.2"8 For example, Thomas Willis, one of the first English physicians to
write extensively on madness, explained that the insane, having lost their
reason, were fierce creatures who had "descended to a brutish state" and
"enjoyed superhuman strength., 239 If the mad were to be cured, they:
needed to hold their physicians in awe and think of them as
their "tormentors." Discipline, threats, fetters, and blows are
needed as much as medical treatment. .. . Truly nothing is
more necessary and more effective for the recovery of these
people than forcing them to respect and fear intimidation.
Such rhetoric of the "lunatic" as beast or animal possessing super-
human strength is disconcerting given its resonance with stereotypical
depictions of Black people. Racist vitriol often invokes the animalization
of Blacks and a call for containment based upon superhuman strength and
brutish tendencies.2 Furthermore, the historical role of the mental health
professional in orchestrated intimidation has historical connections to the
abuses of slavery discussed above. The connections are troubling as the
history of the mental health profession indicates that doctors would resort
to what they called "breaking" their patients.4 Breaking would involve
bleeding, purging, emetics, nausea-inducing agents, blistering, and near-
starvation diets, in order to "reduce even the strongest maniac to a pitiful,
whimpering state.
24 3
There was a clear racist subtext to early mental health "science."The
Mentally ill were also seen as unfit to breed and produce children. Based
on the idea that the mentally ill should be sterilized, speakers at the Sec-
ond International Congress on Eugenics 4 presented papers suggesting
that the "financial costs societies incurred by caring for defectives, the
inheritability of insanity and other disorders, and the low birth rates of the
elite in America" necessitated serious consideration of the sterilization of
238. See id. at 6-8.
239. Id. at 6.
240. Id. (alteration in original) (citations onitted).
241. See, e.g., Anti-Defamation League, David Duke: In His Own Words, at
http://www.adl.org/special-reports/duke-ownwords/print.asp (last visited Oct. 23,
2003) ("Divorced from White influence and culture, [Blacks] reverted quickly to their
genotype.... Males exhibited exaggerated aggression and promiscuity.... White people
don't need a law against rape, but if you fill this room up with your normal [B]lack bucks,
you would because niggers are basically primitive animals.").
242. See WHITAKER, supra note 237, at 7.
243. Id.
244. This conference was largely financed by the Carnegie Institution and the
Rockefeller Foundation. Some professors and scientists from the finest institutions in the
country (such as Johns Hopkins, Princeton, Harvard, Columbia, Cornell, MIT, and NYU)
spoke at the conference and supported the White supremacist Eugenics movement. See id.
at 52-53.
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undesirables. It is a slippery slope from undesirable to White supremacy
as the conference delegates spoke on "The Jewish Problem," the dangers
of "Negro-White Intermixture'" and the "Pedigrees of Pauper Stocks.,
246
This racialized bias in mental health has a long history. "During the
nineteenth century, the perceived mental health of African Americans was
closely tied to their legal status as free men or slaves. 247 African Americans
who lived in free states or stated a desire for freedom were at a height-
ened risk for being deemed mad. 29 The Census of 1840 reported that
"insanity was eleven times more common among Negroes living in the
North than in the South. ' 24 9 Southern politicians used this statistic as evi-
dence that "bondage was good for Negroes ' 250 and used mental health
rhetoric to justify the peculiar institution. Indeed, Senator John C. Cal-
houn reasoned that slavery was necessary because "[t]he African is
incapable of self-care and sinks into lunacy under the burden of freedom.
It is a mercy to give him the guardianship and protection from mental
death 
,251
With any doctrine, science, or principle, whether good is achieved
depends on its application and deployment. While intrinsic doctrinal neu-
trality might not exist either, it is clear that historical utilization of the
"sciences" has produced sites of marginalization with findings of congeni-
tal illness along racial lines' 2S-mental health diagnosis have not been
245. Id. at 53.
246. Id. At the end of the meeting, prominent eugenicists formed a committee to
establish a national eugenics society that would recruit a scientific advisory council by
sending a letter to candidates that warned of "racial deterioration and the need for societal
leaders to resist the complete destruction of the white race." Id. The letter claimed that
"our burden of taxes can be reduced by decreasing the number of degenerates, delin-
quents, and defectives supported in public institutions." Id. Hitler took the idea of
eugenics to its "ultimate end" by instituting gas chambers to kill the mentally ill because
he believed, as did others in the United States, that the insane were "social wastage," "ma-
lignant biological growths," and "poisonous slime." Id. at 64-66. Harvard's Earnest Hooten
described the insane as "specimens of humanity who really ought to be exterminated." Id.
at 65.
247. Id. at 171.
248. Id.
249. Id. One reason for this disparity is that Whites in some northern counties told
census takers that "all of the Negroes in their communities were crazy." Id.
250. Id.
251. Id.
252. Indeed, even the color of the skin of Black people has been pathologized. Ben-
jamin Rush, the father of psychiatry, whose face still adorns the seal of the American
Psychiatric Association, pathologized blackness as a disease-Negritude. Rush theorized
that "the Negro suffered from congenital leprosy which . . . 'appeared in so mild a form
that excess pigmentation was its only symptom."' THoMAS S. SZASZ, THE MANUFACTURE OF
MADNRESS: A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF THE INQUISITION AND THE MENTAL HEALTH MOVE-
MENT 154-55 (1970).With this theory, Rush "made the Negro a medically safe domestic,"
while at the same time called for his sexual segregation as a carrier of a dreaded hereditary
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immune from such misuse and has historically been used to oppress the
marginalized according to race.: For instance, in 1851, Samuel Cart-
wright, a prominent physician, wrote in the New Orleans Medical and
Surgical Journal that he had discovered two new types of insanity among254
slaves. The first, drapetomania, was diagnosed every time a slave desired
to run away.255 The second, dysaesthesia aethiopis, was characterized by
idleness and improper respect for the master's property. Dr. Cartwright
advised that light beatings and hard labor reliably cured this mental illness.
Accordingly, medicine could turn an "arrant rascal" into "a good Negro
that can hoe or plow. '2 ' After the Civil War ended:
[tihe definition of sanity in Negroes was still tied to behavior
that a slave owner liked to see: a docile, hardworking laborer
who paid him proper respect. Negroes who strayed too far
from that behavioral norm were candidates for being declared
insane and were put away in asylums, jails, and poorhouses.
Nationwide, the incidence of "insanity" among Negroes rose
fivefold between 1860 and 1880, and once again, such statistics
disease. Id. Here, then, was an early model of the perfect medical concept of illness-one
that helps the physician and the society he serves, while justifying social maltreatment as
medical prophylaxis. Id. at 155. Accordin to Szasz: "Rush looked to science and found
what he wanted: It was not God but nature that marked the [Bllack man; his blackness,
moreover, is a sign, not of his 'congenital sin' but of his 'congenital illness."'" Id. at 156-57.
253. Many doctors tried to give medical justification for treating Negroes differently.
In 1886,J.M. Buchanan, a Mississippi asylum Doctor, stated that Negroes:
did not have the biological brainpower to live free in a civilized country be-
cause the growth of the [Negro] brain is arrested by premature closing of the
cranial sutures. When enslaved, he added, the childish Negro was able to en-
joy life, fat, sleek, and contented, his mind unburdened by cares, and his
passions and aninal instincts kept in abeyance by the will of his master.
WHITA IER, supra note 237, at 172 (citations omitted).
Thirty-five years later another physician,WM. Bevis, published an article that stated
that "Negroes were particularly prone to psychotic illness ... because they were descen-
dants of savages and cannibals and thus, as free men in America, were living in an
environment of higher civilization for which the biological development of the race had
not made adequate preparation." Id. Doctors' frequent diagnoses of schizophrenia in
Blacks in the first part of the twentieth century was attributable to "cultural beliefs that
Blacks were happy-go-lucky and lacked the intelligence to worry about the myriad
stresses in life. They might become maniacal or crazy in their thoughts but--or so the
belief went-they weren't very likely to become morbidly sad." Id.
254. Samuel A. Cartwright. Diseases and Peculiarities of the Negro Race, 11 DEBow's
R-Ev., S. &W STATES (1851).
255. This occurred because the owner stirred this mental illness by being too kind to
their Negroes ... treating them as equals, which confused the poor slaves because God had
made them to be submissive knee benders, even giving them a super flexible knee joint
for this purpose. Id.
256. Id.
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were seen by many Southern doctors as evidence that the
"colored race" simply couldn't handle freedom.5 7
Some contemporary information should similarly generate concern
about arbitrary diagnosis of mental illness in Blacks. A study in 1982 of
1,023 African Americans diagnosed as schizophrenic determined that 64
percent did not exhibit symptoms necessary, under prevailing American
258Psychiatric Association (APA) guidelines, for making such a diagnosis.
Other studies found that Blacks were being disproportionately put into
subcategories of schizophrenia that "connote dangerousness and (patho-
logical) severity," and that in comparison with whites, they were more
likely to be committed against their will to a psychiatric unit.
2
5
9
Of course, the history of the mental health profession also has gen-
dered dimensions. Women who were found to be insane during the 1890s
and the first decade of the nineteenth century were treated by gyneco-
logical surgeries because it was linked to the "sexuality" of the woman; an
overly sexual woman was seen as abnormal, and therefore, ins 260ovely exal as r , insane. Many
gynecologists were so avid in their enthusiasm for curing insanity by sur-
gically removing the uterus or ovaries that the American Medico-
Psychological Association, in the early 1890s, cautioned against the over-
use of this remedy. Even so, for the next fifteen years, various
gynecologists continued to claim that hysterectomies and ovariectomies
257. WHITAKER, supra note 237, at 171-72.
258. Id. at 173.
259. Id.
260. See id. at 78-79. Grob writes:
Of course this diagnosis related only to White woman, as at the same time
Black women were seen as normatively sexual beings with heightened sexual
proclivities. The example of Lillian Thomas, age twenty-two, was instructive.
She had been cared for at public expense since the age of ten. After becom-
ing independent, she fell in love and agreed to "illicit relations" with a man
and subsequently became pregnant. She rejected his proposal of marriage be-
cause she "preferred the alternative of living single and fighting out her own
battle rather than being the wife of a drunkard." After giving birth at a home
for expectant unmarried females, she was committed to Boston Psychopathic
for a determination of her ability to care for the child. Investigation by social
workers found that she entertained men in her rooms in the evening, and
"went often to dances and came home very late." Staff disapproval of such
behavior did not extend to African American females. Hypersexual activity
in White females was taken as evidence of psychopathy to the staff; similar
behavior by Black women was regarded as an expression of an ingrained
natural immorality of that race.
GERALD N. GROB, THE MAD AMONG Us: A HISTORY OF THE CARE OF AMERICA'S MENTALLY
ILL 150-51 (1994).
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produced improvement in more than fifty percent of their insane female
S 261
patients.
In essence, much of the history of mental health professions reveals
the manufacture of "madness" as a site of marginalization and oppres-
26226
sion. By exposing that patriarchy of madness,263 Foucault articulated the
artifice of mental illness. Rather than originating in the world of the irra-
tional, the madman is stigmatized since "he crosses the frontiers of
261. WHITAKER, supra note 237, at 78.Whitaker states:
"The gynecologist," proclaimed WO. Henry, at the 1906 annual meeting of
the American Medical Association, "may cure various forms of insanity if
[pelvic] irritation is entirely removed ... by whatever means are necessary, no
matter how radical the [surgical] work required." Much attention also fo-
cused on the pathological influence that the vagina and the nerve-rich
clitoris could have on the female mind. Women, said one physician, "are
deeply concerned about these organs," and "insanity may occur because their
minds are very much agitated" by this undue concern. Direct evidence of a
female mind led astray could sometimes be found through measurement of
her genitalia: women with "hypertrophy" of the clitoris were presumed to be
habitual masturbators. The reason ... was that masturbation stirred blood
flow to the external genitalia, which led to the "exaggerated nutrition of
these organs" and thus abnormal growth. Since masturbation was viewed as a
cause of insanity, some sought to cure it [by removing the clitoris and
uterus].
Id. at 78-79 (citations omitted).
262. Thomas S. Szasz has cogently articulated the similarities between the use of the
inquisitions as a way of containing dissidents and deviants and psychiatry as performing
the same function:
In the new--secular and 'scientific'--cultural climate, as in any other, there
were still the disadvantaged, the disaffected, and the men who thought and
criticized too much. Conformity was still demanded. The nonconformist, the
objector, in short, all who denied or refused to affirm society's dominant val-
ues, were still the enemies of society To be sure, the proper ordering of this
new society was no longer conceptualized in terms of Divine Grace; instead,
it was viewed in terms of Public Health. Its internal enemies were thus seen
as mad; and Institutional Psychiatry came into being, as had the Inquisition
earlier, to protect the group from this threat.
SzAsz, supra note 252, at 13.
263. According to Foucault:
The entire existence of madness, in the world now being prepared for it, was
enveloped in what we may call, in anticipation, a 'parental complex.' The
prestige of patriarchy is revived around madness ... henceforth ... the dis-
course of unreason will be linked with ... the dialectic of the family . .. the
madman remains a minor and for a long time reason will retain for him the
aspect of the father ... He isolated the social structure of the bourgeois fam-
ily, reconstituted it symbolically in the mental asylum, and set it adrift in
history.
FOUCAULT, supra note 233, at 58.
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bourgeois order of his own accord, and alienates himself outside the sa-
cred limits of its ethic.' 264 Foucault, therefore, insightfully problematized
the tensions inherent in a diagnosis of mental illness by highlighting its
potential for strategic deployment. He recognized that mental illness has,
to a certain extent, been constructed to contain those deemed deviant
according to race, gender, class,
'2 6 or sexuality: 266
He accepts the Other in so far as the Other conforms to his
image and conduct. However, if he and the Other differ, he
defines the Other as defective-physically, mentally, or mor-
ally-and accepts him only if he is able and willing to cast off
those of his features that set him apart from the normal. If the
Other recants his false beliefs, or submits to treatment for his
illness, then, and only then, will he be accepted as a member
of the group. If he fails to do these things, the Other becomes
the Evil one-whether he be called the Stranger, the Patient,
or the Enemy.267
This post-modern conclusion provides a reality-check for one
who attempts to advocate the potentially liberatory use of these disci-
plines. Mental health practitioners and the discipline itself became
architects of confinement-in some sense the keepers of the status2681
quo. If, as the marginalized are apt to do, a person of color stepped out
264. Id.
265. As explained by Foucault:
All the poor who are capable of working must, upon work days, do what is
necessary to avoid idleness, which is the mother of all evils, as well as to ac-
custom them to honest toil and also to earning some part of their
sustenance.... The classical age used confinement in an equivocal manner,
making it play a double role: to reabsorb unemployment, or at least eliminate
its most visible social effects, and to control costs when they seemed likely to
become too high; to act alternately on the manpower market and on the cost
of production.
Id. at 53-54.
266. Szasz recognizes that: "Psychiatric preoccupation with the disease concept of
homosexuality-as with the disease concept of all so-called mental illnesses, such as alco-
holism, drug addiction, or suicide-conceals the fact that homosexuals are a group of
medically stigmatized and socially persecuted individuals." SZAsz, supra note 252, at 168.
267. Id. at 159.
268. Whitaker argues:
So too is Institutional Psychiatry an implementation of the unwritten laws of
power-maintenance in a society insufficiently committed to honoring the
Rule of Law. Feeling sad cannot very well be made illegal; but a poor
woman who is depressed (and refuses to play the role assigned to her in soci-
ety) can be conmmitted. Commitment-law is thus an adjunct to American
[VOL. 9:77
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of their assigned place or challenged the race-based schema, psychiatry
and psychology could be summoned to do the dirty work of maintain-
ing a racialized order which preserved White supremacy. A devastatingly
simple example is the case of Clennon King who in 1958 became the
first African-American to apply for admission to the University of Mis-
sissippi. Mr. King dared challenge the racist status quo by seeking an
education. He was committed to a state mental hospital because "any
[B]lack man who thought he could get into Ole Miss was obviously out
of touch with reality.
26 9
Similarly, women seeking to operate outside of the ascribed socie-
tal dictates were seen as insane. In this context, the diagnosis of
"madness" often appears for women who have totally or partially re-
jected their assigned sex-role. Women who fully act out the
conditioned female role are clinically viewed as neurotic or psychotic
and their hospitalization or commitment produces diagnosis for pre-
dominantly female behaviors such as depression, suicidal tendencies,
anxiety neurosis, paranoia, or "promiscuity.2 7 2 Women who reject or are
ambivalent about the female role frighten both themselves and society
so much so that their ostracism and self-destructiveness assures them a
psychiatric label-if they are hospitalized, it is for failing to adhere to
the dictates of their assigned gender, with labels of 'schizophrenia,' 'lesbi-
anism,' or 'promiscuity being attached. -3
Moreover, as recently as 1938, moral deficiency, masturbation, mis-
anthropy, and vagabondage were listed among the forty psychiatric
disorders in a leading textbook. Homosexuality, which had been univer-
sally regarded as a manifestation of mental illness by Western psychiatry,
was "officially" de-pathologized in 1973, after a contentious political
struggle, by a vote of the board of trustees of the American Psychiatric
Association.274
Law on the books; it helps the rich and well-educated to keep the poor and
ill-educated in their place.
Id. at 64.
269. Id. at 215.
270. "When the celebrated Mrs. Packard was hospitalized in the Jacksonville State
Insane Asylum for disagreeing with her minister-husband, the commitment laws of the
state of Illinois explicitly proclaimed that,'Married women ... may be entered or detained
in the hospital at the request of the husband of the woman or the guardian ... without
evidence of insanity required in other cases."' SzAsz, supra note 252, at 15.
271. See, e.g., PHYLLIS CHESLER, WOMEN AND MADNESS 94 (1972) (describing one
research subject's experience with her family after announcing her dreams of becoming an
artist).
272. Promiscuity, like frigidity, is both a female and a non-female trait: either can
mean a flight into or a flight from femininity. Id. at 93.
273. See id.
274. Robert L. Woolfolk, The Concept of Mental Illness: An Analysis of Four Pivotal Is-
sues, 22J. MIND & BEHAV. 161,173 (2001).
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What these seemingly diverse "therapeutic" movements have
in common not only with one another but also with such
modern totalitarian movements as National Socialism and
Communism, is that each seeks to protect the integrity of an
excessively heterogeneous and pluralistic society and its
dominant ethic. To accomplish this end, each represses certain
individual and moral interests, and, in general, sacrifices the
"one" for "many," the "I" for the "we"; finally, to simplify the
conceptual problem it faces, and to strengthen group cohe-
sion, each channels-by systematic propaganda accompanied
by the use of a brutal show of force-enmity toward a sym-
bolic offender to whom the impending disintegration of the
social order is attributed.27'
Accepting for the moment that doctrine and discourse are captive
and behooven, to a certain extent, to the culture and society in which
they are manifested, what does that mean for the application, both legal
and psychological, of the critical psychology discussed herein? That an
alternative legal or mental health typology generated by those commu-
nities most affected by the relevant doctrines does not exist highlights
the inherent tension found in so many disciplines-the challenge of us-
ing the very same doctrinal tools tainted from the construction of
oppressive systems to destroy, reconstruct or reconfigure the system is
necessarily precarious. Accordingly, given the problematic history and
legacy of diagnostic pathologization of marginalized communities, a
perfect legal and ethical option might not exist for racialized communi-
ties, other than proceeding with extreme caution while embracing the
intention not to allow repetition of past mistakes.
At this juncture, critical race theory scholarship on multiple identi-
ties and systems of oppression is informative, as the importance of
the confluence of race and potential pathologization based on mental
vulnerabilities is of paramount importance. These frameworks for analy-
sis are alternatively referenced as models which are holistic,
277
275. SZASZ, supra note 252, at 59.
276. See U.S. DEP'T HEALTH & HuMAN SERVICES, HEALTHY PEOPLE 2000: NATIONAL
HEALTH PROMOTION AND DISEASE PREVENTION OBJECTIVES 542 (1990); see also Break the
Glass Ceiling: Equal Opportunities for Women and Minorities, Statistics,
http://www.breaktheglassceiling.com/STrninorities.htm (last visited Dec. 4, 2003)
(describing the lack of diversity in the legal profession).
277. See Elvia Arriola, Gendered Inequality: Lesbians, Gays, and Feminist Legal Theory,
9 BERKELEY WOMEN'S L.J. 103,139-41 (1994).
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intersectional interlocking, multidimensional2 0 or multiply con-
scious.2 8 ' In any event, it is instructive to use analytical paradigms which
recognize that negative societal consequences flow from sites where
multiple forms of oppression operate.
Hypothesizing identity, and the corresponding systems of oppres-
sion, as running along a single axis is misleading and has the tendency to
oversimplify unstated reference points by essentializing. 28 2 While it is
easier to overlook the distinct characteristics that comprise an individual
and instead make an assessment based on an interpretation of "domi-
nant" features, identity performance 28 3 or ascribed otherness, this point
of departure ignores other overlapping reference points by its exclusivity.
This phenomenon, of treating identities, or ascriptions, as separate, paral-
lel and independent factors, is known as identity splitting2 4-it is the
heuristic counterpoint to what critical race theorist have alternatively
278. KimberlE Crenshaw, Mapping the Margins: Intersectionality, Identity Politics, and
Violence Against Women of Color, 43 STArN. L. REV. 1241, 1242 (1991) ("Feminist efforts to
politicize experiences of women and antiracist efforts to politicize experiences of peo-
ple of color have frequently proceeded as though the issues and experiences they each
detail occur on mutually exclusive terrains.").
279. See Paulette M. Caldwell, A Hair Piece: Perspectives on the Intersection of Race and
Gender, 1991 DuKE L.J. 365, 376 ("interlocking system of oppression based on race and
gender that operates to the detriment of all women and all blacks"); Mari J. Matsuda, Be-
side My Sister, Facing the Enemy: Legal Theory out of Coalition, 43 STAN. L. REV. 1183, 1189
(1991) ("all forms of subordination are interlocking and mutually reinforcing"); Francisco
Valdes, Queers, Sissies, Dykes, and Tomboys: Deconstructing the Conflation of "Sex," "Gender," and
"Sexual Orientation" in Euro-American Law and Society, 83 CAL. L. REV. 1, 374 (1995) ("op-
pressions of various sorts always interlock because popular prejudice travels in multiples").
280. See Darren Lenard Hutchinson, Out Yet Unseen: A Racial Critique of Gay and
Lesbian Legal Theory and Political Discourse, 29 CONN. L. REV. 561, 636-44 (1997); see also
Darren Lenard Hutchinson, Ignoring the Sexualization of Race: Heteronormativity, Critical Race
Theory and Anti-Racist Politics, 47 BuFF. L. REV. 1, 10 (1999) [hereinafter Hutchinson, Ignor-
ing the Sexualization of Race] ("multidimensionality posits that individual acts of
discrimination and the various institutions of oppression are complex and multilayered,
owing their existence to a host of interlocking sources of advantage and disadvantage").
281. See generally Angela P Harris, Race and Essentialism in Feminist Legal Theory, 42
STAN. L. REv. 581, 586-87 (1990); Mari J. Matsuda, When the First Quail Calls: Multiple
Consciousness as Jurisprudential Method, 11 WOMEN'S RTS L. REP. 7 (1989).
282. See Theresa Raffaele Jefferson, Note, Toward A Black Lesbian2Jurispndence, 18 B.C.
THiRD WORLD L.J. 263,265 (1998).
283. See Devon W Carbado & Mitu Gulati, The Fifth Black Woman, 11 J. CoNTEMP.
LEGAL IssuEs 701, 701 (2001) ("the theory of identity performance is that a person's ex-
periences with and vulnerability to discrimination are based not just on a status marker of
difference (call this a person's status identity) but also on the choices that person makes
about how to present her difference (call this a person's performance identity)").
284. See generally Jefferson, supra note 282; Guadalupe T. Luna, On the Complexities of
Race: The Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo and Dred Scott v. Sandford, 53 U. MiAMi L. REv. 691
(1999).
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recognized as intersecting or multidimensional2 8 6 aspects of person-
hood.2 7
The concept of intersectionality emerged out of the particular
forms of discrimination experienced by women of color that were nei-
ther recognized in feminist legal theory nor traditional civil rights
scholarship. It recognized that the totality of oppression at identity cross-
roads was more than the sum of the parts: 288 "Because the intersectional
experience is greater than the sum of racism and sexism, any analysis that
does not take intersectionality into account cannot sufficiently address the
particular manner in which Black women are subordinated., 28 9 Intersec-
tionality illuminates the manner in which women of color are affected by
both racial hierarchy and patriarchy.
In the context of Black women and political discourse, for example,
political intersectionality highlights the simultaneous identity positioning
within at least two inferior groups-women and Blacks-that frequently
experience conflicting political agendas. Intersectionality in this context
recognizes that political interests of women of color are masked and
sometimes endangered by political strategies that ignore or suppress inter-
sectional issues. 290 Accordingly, the intersectionality model developed as a
response to an absence of theoretical or doctrinal approaches to the mul-
tilayered and particularized subordination endured by women of color.
Such a framework of analysis allows for reflection on oppression in nu-
merous venues, including, but not limited to politics, economics and the
law.
Originally developed in the context of the experiential diversity of
gay and lesbian existence, multidimensionality was conceived of as a
methodology by which to analyze the impact of racial and class oppres-
285. Crenshaw, supra note 278 (considering how the experiences of women of color
are frequently the product of intersecting patterns of racism and sexism and how these
experiences tend not to be represented within the discourses of either feminism or anti-
racism). Professor Crenshaw demonstrates that the intersection of racism and sexism
factors into the lives of Black women in ways that cannot be captured entirely by looking
separately at the race and gender experiences alone. See id.
286. See Darren Lenard Hutchinson, "Gay Rights" for "Gay Whites"?:Race, Sexual
Identity, and Equal Protection Discourse, 85 CORNELL L. REv. 1358 (2000).
287. See, e.g., Caldwell, supra note 279, at 371-76; Crenshaw, supra note 278, at 1242;
Trina Grillo & Stephanie M. Wildman, Obscuring the Importance of Race: The Implication of
Making Comparisons Between Racism and Sexism (Or Other -Isms), DUKE L.J. 397, 401-10
(1991); Matsuda, supra note 279, at 1184. See generally CRITICAL RACE FEMINIsM:A READER
(Adrien Katherine Wing ed., 1997); Darren Lenard Hutchinson, Black Gays and Lesbians,
Racial Politics, and the Million Man March, in BLACK MEN ON RACE, GENDER, AND SEXUALiTY:
A CRITICAL READER 28, 28-31 (DevonW Carbado ed., 1999).
288. Crenshaw, supra note 278.
289. Crenshaw, supra note 57, at 140.
290. Id.
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sion upon sexual subordination, gay and lesbian experience and identity
and to cease treating these forces as separable, mutually exclusive, or even
conflicting phenomena. 91 More generally, multidimensionality posits that
individual acts of discrimination and the various mechanisms of oppres-
sion are complex and multilayered, owing their existence to a host of
interlocking sources of advantage and disadvantage.
Multidimensionality complicates the very notion of privilege and
subordination by pushing legal theorists and political activists to recognize
the multiple and complex ways in which all individuals experience op-1 92
pression. As an outgrowth of intersectionality, multidimensionality
differs conceptually as it attempts to complicate the implications of inter-
sectionality that may lead to the conclusion that social identity categories
or systems of oppression only "intersect" in the lives of persons burdened
by multiple sources of disempowerment, such as women of color.293
Both intersectionality and multidimensionality recognize the exac-
erbation of oppression flowing from the confluence of compounding
systems of domination and the complicated matrix of social identity
around which power and disempowerment are distributed. Where systems
of race, gender, and class domination converge, as they often do in the
experience of mentally vulnerable people of color, intervention strategies
based exclusively on the experiences ofWhite men will be inadequate to
overcome the obstacles faced at the confluence of marginalized identities.
Similarly the nexus of race and mental vulnerability, as identified by
critical psychology, might provide a treacherous point of departure for
haphazard or unsympathetic legal intervention for a number of reasons.
First, despite unprecedented knowledge gained in the past three decades
about the brain and human behavior, mental health, and mental illness in
particular, is often an afterthought and illnesses of the mind are shrouded
in fear, are misunderstood and maligned. 294 The alternate hyper-visibility
or complete invisibility of mental vulnerability translates into punish-
ment29s-a penalty for the inability, lack of understanding or refusal to
291. Hutchinson, Ignoring the Sexualization of Race, supra note 280, at 18. For example,
the heterosexual stereotype that men of color, particularly Black males are violent sexual
threats to White women has been offered to justify violent racial marginalization. Similarly,
history has portrayed women of color as heterosexually promiscuous, and laws and social
practices have reduced then to sexual property in a variety of contexts, including the le-
gally sanctioned sexual abuse of female slaves. Id.
292. Id.
293. Id. at 12.
294. DAVID SATCHER, MENTAL HEALTH: A REPORT OF THE SURGEON GENERAL, Fore-
word, http://www.surgeongeneral.gov/library/mentalhealth/home.html (last visited Dec.
4, 2003) (describing how mental illness is misunderstood by the public).
295. See SzAsZ, supra note 252, at 63-64. Szasz notes:
Today, the Scientific Establishment supplies the ideology, the State the power.
Formerly, the inquisitor accused the citizen of witchcraft and proved him to
be a witch; he then "relaxed" the witch to the "secular arm"-this is, the
FALL 2003]
Michigan Journal of Race & Law
adhere to societal mandates.296 Second, the convergence of racism and
mental challenge is a messy affair given historical and contemporary
pathologization of Blackness, even in the absence of diagnosable mental
health issues.9
One must therefore approach the infusion of critical psychology and
the law with caution. Any legal intervention that seeks to infuse the
criminal law with the critical psychology addressed above must be done
with learned trepidation and conscious caution, for it is a slippery descent
to the equivalence of Blackness with madness or Blackness with badness.
Concern must also be voiced for the potential over-medication of indi-
viduals deemed mad or bad-the equation of Black youth with badness is
already a site for critical concern. 298 The ability of the legal and the mental
health disciplines to act as both sword and shield is enough to justify an
ever-vigilant historically knowledgeable approach to infusion, lest critical
psychology be appropriated or co-opted to further subordinating ends.
While such intersectional subordination does not have to be inten-
tional, and might even be well-intentioned, 9 the interface of race and
mental challenge has the potential to be the site of yet another oppressive
interaction generated by societally constructed multi-axial oppression.
Simply put, the articulation of a multi-axial identity revolving around the
intersection of race and mental illness might play all too easily into the
State-and he was burned at the stake. Today, the institutional psychiatrist ac-
cuses the citizen of mental illness and diagnoses him as psychotic; he then
turns him over to the court-that is, the state-and he is committed to a
prison called a mental hospital.
Id.
296. Jefferson, supra note 282, at 263.
297. See generally SZASZ, supra note 252;J.H. Carter, Racism's Impact on Mental Health,
86 J. NAT'L MED. Ass'N 543 (1994); Mental Health: A Report of the Surgeon General,
http://www.mentalhealth.org/cre/toc.asp (last visited Dec. 4, 2003); CHARLYN HARPER-
BROWNE, TEACHING BLACK PSYCHOLOGY-A RESOURCE MANUAL, http://www.swagga.com/
racism.htm (last visited Dec. 4, 2003) (listing specific examples of scientific racism).
298. Angela Olivia Burton, Black Children,Juvenile Justice, and Mental Health:A Repara-
tions Perspective (unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
299. Dr. Szasz takes a somewhat radical stance on what he labels benevolent paternal-
ism arguing that:
Since the Inquisition, oppressors have insisted on wearing the uniforms of
helpers. First, they donned the garb of the cleric. Today they will not show
themselves without their white medical coats. Benevolent paternalism (if one
wants to so mislabel human evil) was the basic article of faith and the fun-
damental strategic weapon for the clergyman's domination of those he
deemed sinners; and so it has continued for the psychiatrist's domination of
those he deems mad.
SzAsz, supra note 252, at 157-58.
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hands of proponents of racialized theories of genetic inferiority bent on
further disempowerment of already marginalized communities.'
The legal and psychological literature reveals ample reason for con-
cern. Foremost among these are the disparate rates of incarceration and
subsequent disenfranchisement of Blacks in America; 301 the over-diagnosis
of Blacks with schizophrenia 0 2 and other conditions leading to over-
medication, over-commitment of Blacks to psychiatric facilities on an in-
patient basis, and the limited diversity within the professions of law, psy-• 303
chology and psychiatry.
In addition to the concern for pathologization some would posit a
futility to any criminal law recognition of critical psychology in the con-
text discussed above. Specifically, the affirmative defenses discussed above
do not implicate mental health treatment modalities; rather they implicate
mitigated sentencing and shortened incarceration. The criminal justice
system, as it presently exists, is ill-equipped to address the mental health
issues of the vast majority of prisoners, let alone the mental health issues
300. See RicHARD J. HERRNSTEIN & CHARLES MURRAY, THE BELL CURVE: INTELLI-
GENCE AND CLASS STRUCTURE IN AMERICAN LIFE (1996); Phillip Ruston, Race as a Biological
Concept, at http://www.euvolution.com/articles/race.html (last visited Dec. 4, 2003).
301. See National Ass'n for the Advancement of Colored People, Reenfranchisement:
American Justice Allows People to Return to Society: Why Can't They Vote?, at
http://www.naacp.org/work/voter/reenfranchisement.shti (last visited Oct. 23, 2003);
MARC MAUER & TRACY HULING, YOUNG BLACK AMERICANS AND THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE
SYSTEM: FIVEYEARS LATER (1995); Fox Butterfield, Study Finds Big Increase in Black Men as
Inmates Since 1980, N.YTIMES,Aug. 28, 2002, at A14;Allen J. Beck, Prison andJail Inmates
at Midyear 1999, BUREAU JUSTICE STATISTICS: BULLETIN 1 (2000), http://www.ojp.usdoj.
gov/bjs/pub/pdf/pjim99.pdf (last visited Dec. 4, 2003); Allen J. Beck & Thomas P. Bonc-
zar, Lifetime Likelihood of Going to State or Federal Prison, BUREAU JUSTICE STATISTICS:
SPECIAL REPORT 1 (1997), http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/llgsfp.pdf (last visited
Dec. 4, 2003).
302. In 1973, Stanford University Psychology professor David Rosenhan conducted a
study to show that the label "schizophrenia" was being loosely applied to patients in hos-
pitals. WHITAKER, supra note 237, at 170. Rosenhan and seven others went to hospitals
complaining of fake symptoms that included hearing voices and other noises, otherwise
they behaved calm and described their relationships with others as they were. Id. Every
time these patients were admitted and treated for schizophrenia, Rosenhan stated that
other patients would tell him and the others they were "not crazy." Id. This implied that
the people who were deemed insane could see they were not crazy but the doctors could
not. Id. Furthermore, the study showed that the American doctors were preferentially ap-
plying the label to people with Black skin and to the poor. Id. He also wrote that we now
know that "we are unable to distinguish sanity from insanity." Id.
303. See National Institute of Mental Health Report, An Investment In America's Fu-
ture: Racial/Ethnic Diversity in Mental Health Research Careers, a report of the National Advisory
Mental Health Council Workgroup on Racial! Ethnic Diversity in Researct, Training and Health
Disparities Research, http://www.nimh.nih.gov/council/diversity.pdf (last visited Oct. 23,
2003); see also U.S. DEP'T HEALTH & HUMAN SERVICES, supra note 276; Break the Glass
Ceiling, supra note 276.
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which may result from racial abuses.1 4 Despite the overpopulation of
prisons with people of color, the possibilities of culturally competent
mental health services in the prison context are discouraging.3 0
The likelihood of suitable treatment opportunities is also dishearten-
ing outside of the prison context. Even the Surgeon General concluded
that the existing mental health care system is ill-suited to address the
needs of people of color. °6 The 2001 Surgeon General's supplemental
report on mental health emphasizes the importance of considering race,
culture and ethnicity in addressing the mental health needs of a diverse
population. The report 3 7 confirms that serious disparities exist regarding
the mental health services delivered to racial and ethnic minorities. 38 The
supplemental report concludes that to achieve the benefits of effective
mental health preventive and treatment services, "cultural and historical
context must be accounted for in designing, adapting, and implementing
services and service delivery systems. ' 9
304. See TERRY KUPERS, PRIsoN MADNESS: THE MENTAL HEALTH CRISIS BEHIND BARs
AND WHAT WE MUST Do ABOUT IT (1994); Report of Human Rights Watch, "Ill Equipped:
US Prisons and Offenders with Mental Illness," at http://www.hrw.org/reports/2003/
usal003 (last visited Oct. 23,2003).
305. The Corrections Yearbook 2001, Statistics on Prison Populations,
http://www.cji-inc.com/cyb/download/01race-percent.pdf (last visited Dec. 4,2003).
306. See SATCHER, supra note 294; Mental Health: Culture, Race, Ethnicity, supra note
90.The Surgeon General's Report concludes that:
Disparities in access to mental health services are partly attributable to finan-
cial barriers. Many of the working poor, among whom African Americans
are overrepresented, do not qualify for public coverage and work in jobs that
do not provide private coverage. Better access to private insurance is an im-
portant step, but is not in itself sufficient. African American reliance on
public financing suggests that provisions of the Medicaid program are also
important. Publicly financed safety net providers are a critical resource in the
provision of care to African American communities. Disparities in access also
come about for reasons other than financial ones. Few mental health special-
ists are available for those African Americans who prefer an African American
provider. Furthermore, African Americans are overrepresented in areas where
few providers choose to practice. They may not trust or feel welcomed by
the providers who are available. Feelings of mistrust and stigma or percep-
tions of racism or discrimination may keep them away.
Id.
307. Which has as its goal the provision of comprehensive coverage of issues relevant
to the mental health of racial and ethnic minorities and a historical and cultural apprecia-
tion of context within which minority mental health may be better understood.
308. Mental Health: Culture, Race, Ethnicity, supra note 90, at 3.
309. The Supplement "documents the existence of striking disparities for minorities
in mental health services and the underlying knowledge base. Racial and ethnic minorities
have less access to mental health services than do Whites. They are less likely to receive
needed care.When they receive care, it is more likely to be poor in quality." Id.
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The legal system might similarly do well to examine these matters
of context to ensure equality along multiple axes of identity. Despite these
cautionary pronouncements, if all Americans, not just the privileged, are
to place faith in the criminal justice system and be equal before and under
the law, ways and means must be devised for appropriate legal considera-
tion of relevant critical psychology as revealing disparate realities for
certain segments of American society.
CONCLUSION
Murder should never be condoned nor encouraged. Like many
scholars who have analyzed provocation, extreme emotional disturbance,
and diminished capacity defenses, I too recognize the need for criticality
310
of their genesis, subordinating potential and rampant misuse.
In addition to concerns with mitigating defenses stemming from the
definitional concern over the unreasonableness of murder, some of the
critiques of these defenses stems from their homophobic or sexist applica-
tion so as to justify or excuse murder fueled by homophobic rage or
panic,311 misogyny 12 and "face-saving" veiled as cultural practices. 313 If
these defenses are to be abolished, then so be it-this is indeed a tenable
option in light of the homophobia and femicide, that theses defenses have
supported. Given the power of patriarchy and heteronormativity,
3
1
4
310. See Nelson, supra note 4.
311. See Muneer I. Ahmad, Homophobia in the Halls of Justice: Sexual Orientation Bias
and Its Implication Within the Justice System, 11 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL'Y & L. 117
(2002); Joshua Dressier, 4hen "Heterosexual" Men Kill "Homosexual" Men: Reflections on
Provocation Law, Sexual Advances, and the "Reasonable Man" Standard, 85 J. CRiM. L. & CRIMI-
NOLOGY 726 (1995); Robert B. Mison, Homophobia in Manslaughter: The Homosexual Advance
as Insufficient Provocation, 80 CAL. L. REV. 133 (1992).
312. See Jenny Morgan, Provocation Law and Facts: Dead Women Tell No Tales, Tales Are
Told About Them, 21 MELB. U.L. REV. 237 (1997);Victoria Nourse, Passion's Progress: Modern
Law Reform and the Provocation Defense, 106 YALE L.J. 1331 (1997); Melissa Spatz, A Lesser
Crime: A Comparative Study of Legal Defenses for Men Who Kill Their Wives, 24 CoLUM.J.L. &
Soc. PROBs. 597 (1991); Laurie J. Taylor, Comment, Provoked Reason in Men and Women:
Heat-of-Passion Manslaughter and Imperfect Self-Defense, 33 UCLA L. RiEv. 1679 (1986).
313. See Daina C. Chiu, The Cultural Defense: Beyond Exclusion, Assimilation, and
Guilty Liberalism, 82 CAL. L. REv. 1053 (1994); Nilda Rimonte, A Question of Culture: Cul-
tural Approval of Violence Against Women in the Pacific-Asian Community and the Cultural
Defense, 43 STAN. L. REV. 1311 (1991);James J. Sing, Culture as Sameness: Towards a Synthetic
View of Provocation and Culture in the Criminal Law, 108 YALE L.J. 1845 (1999); Leti Volpp,
(Mis)Identifying Culture:Asian Women and the "Cultural Defense," 17 HARV.WOMEN's L.J. 57
(1994).
314. James M. Donovan, Same Sex Union Announcements: Whether Newspapers Must
Publish Them, and Why We Should Care, 68 BROOK. L. REV. 721, 789 (2003); Katherine
Franke, The Central Mistake of Sex Discrimination Law: The Disaggregation of Sex from Gender,
144 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 3-4 (1995);Jillian Todd Weiss, The Gender Caste System: Identity, Pri-
vacy, and Heteronormativity, 10 L. & SEXUALITY 123, 153 (2001).
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however, it is doubtful whether defenses such as these, which have been
so effectively deployed to disempower women and gay men, will be
quickly discarded. Indeed, in the arsenal of the sexist and the homopho-
bic, or just the plain-old desperate attorney, they are the defense strategy
of choice as they resonate with the "majority" when a woman has alleg-
edly been adulterous, or when a man has allegedly "hit-on" another man.
While it might seem inappropriate in the context of a death to in-
voke the logic of "what's good for the goose, is good for the gander,"
there is a simple equality principle inherent in such "ganderism." Formal
equality, the most basic conceptualization of equality, demands equal
treatment for all. The simplicity of "tit for tat" or "an eye-for-an-eye"
logic demands that claims by persons of color to access these, admittedly
corrupted, defenses be seriously considered. Since these defenses are sus-
ceptible to cooptation for subordinating purposes, harnessing the defenses
with the normative goal of racial justice is an alternative deserving of re-
flection-cooptation for liberatory purposes, under principles of formal
equality, should be similarly achievable.
If persons of color claiming access to these defenses on the basis of
critical psychology, racist abuses, or uncontrollable rage are to be denied
mitigated sentences, then an informed carefully articulated doctrinal dif-
ferentiation is demanded; a differentiation which squarely addresses the
disparate application of these defenses in limiting access to a few, thereby
privileging the privileged at the expense of others, namely women, peo-
ple of color and the gay, lesbian, bisexual, and transgendered communities.
In the absence of an explanation delineating the confines of the operation
of these defenses, the emancipatorary potential of these defenses should
be creatively utilized by able defense counsel to further the interests of
their marginalized clients. Why not throw these defenses, infused with
critical psychology where appropriate, into the mix, as it currently exists?
As stated elsewhere, the ideal approach to the provocation, extreme
emotional disturbance and diminished capacity defenses might be a con-
scious and informed application which prevents utilization of these
defenses in a manner that itself works an equality injustice.1 5 In other
words, pro-equality parameters might be articulated around the defenses
such that the margins of their operation do not blur into marginalization
and oppression on the basis of a particular jurisdiction's protected equality
grounds such as race, gender, sex, religion, creed, color, class or sexual ori-
entation. These defenses would not, therefore, be applicable if the
outcome of their mitigatory potential would be to further subjugate
women, if homophobia would be sanctioned, or if racism against tradi-
tionally marginalized communities would be legitimized, for instance. In
this way, the application of the defenses discussed above would be teth-
315. See Nelson, supra note 4, 1011-20.
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ered to the enumerated grounds of protection in a given jurisdiction's
equality guarantees and further the interests of the historically disadvan-
taged. Such quests for equality are not within the exclusive domain of
constitutional law-rather the law, in all its glorious manifestations, should
be harnessed to promote justice. The criminal law affirmative defenses
discussed above might, with the infusion of relevant critical psychology,
provide one such opportunity to achieve the ends of justice.
